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To construct a political union with an autonomous Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), the European Union (EU) must "sooner or later" address the integration 
of the British and French deterrents within a credible West European nuclear consultation 
arrangement. However, there exists little consensus among Britain, France, and Germany 
on the creation of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), much less the 
"course and speed" of integration within the EU. Indeed, the "conflict and contrast" of 
national interests have been most conspicuous when discussions at the highest levels have 
turned towards creating a combined European nuclear posture through the coordination of 
the British and French nuclear forces. Without a "Eurodeterrent," an autonomous CFSP 
for the EU would be impractical due to NATO Europe's continued reliance on US 
nuclear guarantees. However, if an autonomous CFSP were realized, the EU's combined 
nuclear posture would have significant implications for the United States and the Atlantic 
Alliance. Due to the complexity of the issues involved in the creation of a multinational 
European nuclear doctrine and deterrent, the creation of a "Eurodeterrent" should be 
considered the "anchorman" vice the "pacesetter" within the development of the EU's 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
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If the ongoing process of creating a European Monetary Union succeeds, the next 
step for the European Union (EU) would be the creation of a political union. To realize a 
political union with a truly autonomous Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
the EU member states must "sooner or later" address the integration of British and French 
nuclear forces within a credible West European nuclear consultation arrangement. This 
line of reasoning formed the basis for President Mitterrand's 1992 call for a single 
European nuclear doctrine followed later by France's vague offers to devise a European 
dissuasion concertee involving the French deterrent in 1995. 
As leading powers within the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), and the Western European Union (WEU) , Britain, France, and 
Germany constitute the main foundation stones upon which a European Security and 
Defense Identity (ESDI) must be assembled. The London-Paris-BonnlBerlin strategic 
triangle will playa major role in determining the evolution of the WEU as a security and 
defense guarantor in Europe. However, casting Western Europe's "Big Three" in the role 
of the standard bearer for the European integration movement .has always been a 
monumental and elusive task. 
To date, little consensus on the "course and speed" of integration efforts in 
European security and defense matters can be found among Europe's "Big Three." Since 
the 1991 Maastricht Treaty chartered the creation of a CFSP, the performances of the 
WEU on the international stage - such as minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf 
and embargo operations in the Adriatic Sea - have been of relatively limited scope. More 
xi 
recently, policy paralysis vis-a-vis Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo has exposed the 
difficulty of fmding a coherent and cohesive position among the WEU nations. The 
"conflict and contrast" of competing national agendas have been most conspicuous when 
discussions at the highest levels have turned towards the challenges of creating a 
combined European nuclear posture through the coordination (or unification) of the 
British and French national nuclear forces in support of an autonomous European Pillar. 
Although Britain and France have debated the issues at the highest political levels, 
no "common" nuclear doctrine has yet been adopted. Indeed, Britain and France have 
buttressed national sovereignty through "independent" deterrents that serve their 
respective national interests, while also upholding NATO's overall deterrence posture. 
Britain and France are not in a rush to give up their intrinsic rights of national sovereignty 
with respect to managing their national deterrents. Moreover, Germany is in no hurry to 
give up American nuclear guarantees for the unknown qualities of an Anglo-French 
nuclear umbrella. 
Consequently, due to the complexity of the issues involved, the creation of a 
nuclear dimension in European construction should be considered the "anchorman" vice 
the "pacesetter" in the development of the EU's CFSP. Without the "Eurodeterrent," a 
fully autonomous CFSP for the EU would be impractical due to NATO Europe's 
continued reliance on US nuclear commitments. However, if a fully autonomous CFSP 
were ever realized, a truly united Europe - backed by the capabilities provided by nuclear 
weapons - would have significant implications for the United States and Atlantic 
Alliance in the twenty-first century. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Why this sudden bewildennent? This confusion? Why are the streets and 
squares emptying so rapidly, everyone going home, lost in thought? 
Because night has fallen, and the Barbarians have not come! And some of 
our men, just in from the border, say there are no Barbarians any longer. 
Now what's going to happen to us without the Barbarians? They were, 
those people, after all, a kind of solution. 1 
, Constantine Cavafy 
Peace and stability in Europe no longer depend on being able to defend a carrier 
battle group from raids by Soviet Backfire bombers in the eastern Mediterranean or being 
ready to hold the Fulda Gap against the Red Army's onrushing tanks. In the post-Cold 
War era, the NATO Allies have focused more on maintaining security in Europe by 
dealing with the Balkan crisis and the threat of a larger conflict than on the defense of 
NATO Europe against external coercion or aggression. For now, the caliber of peace in 
Europe can be measured more appropriately by the degree of political cohesion among 
the members of the European Union than by the number of carrier battle groups in the 
Mediterranean or the number of armored divisions stationed on the plains of Gennany. 
Although paced by an erratic and unsure drummer, the march towards a wider and deeper 
Europe continues forward. Most of the EU countries plan to adopt a common currency in 
January 1999. US leaders must remain alert because the success of a European Monetary 
Union (EMU) might "change the political character of Europe in ways that may lead to 
conflicts in Europe and confrontations with the United States."2 
1 Constantine Cavafy, Waiting for the Barbarians, Available [Online]: [http://user.ho1.gr/-barbarians], 
November 1998. 
2 Martin Feldstein, "EMU and International Conflict," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (NovemberlDecember 
1997): 60. 
1 
In Western European security affairs, the three most influential countries are 
Britain, France, and Gennany. As leading powers within the European Union (EU), the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Western European Union (WEU), 
Britain, France, and Gennany constitute the main foundation stones upon which a 
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) must be assembled. As Western 
Europe's political-military center of gravity, the London-Paris-BonnlBerlin strategic 
triangle will also playa major role in detennining the evolution of the WEU as a security 
and defense guarantor in Europe and the future of the EU's Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). However, casting Western Europe's "Big Three" in the role of 
the standard bearer for the European integration movement has always been a 
monumental and elusive task. As Peter Schmidt has noted, "[s]ince the failed attempt to 
establish a European Defense Community in the 1950s, Europeans haye never been close 
to establishing the necessary consensus to change the basic security and defense 
structures in Europe."3 
The rise of the WEU - as a European defense organization and champion for a 
greater European defense identity - was held in check from the very outset by the 
development and successes of NATO. In March 1948, the Brussels Treaty parties 
resolved to pursue "collaboration in economic, social, and cultural matters and for 
collective self-defense."4 However, the practical implementation of the WEU's 
3 Peter Schmidt, "ESDI: A German Analysis," in Charles L. Barry, ed., Reforging the Trans-Atlantic 
Relationship (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996),37. 
4 Treaty signed at Brussels on 17 March 1948. WEU Secretariat General, ''Treaty of Economic, social and 
cultural collaboration, and collective self-defence" in Western European Union, Available [Online]: 
[http://www.weu.intleng/docul480317a.htm]. September 1998. 
2 
collective defense responsibilities was transferred to NATO from the early beginnings of 
the Atlantic Alliance, in 1951, and later reiterated in the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954 
due to "the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO."5 Hence, the WEU 
remained non-operational as a military organization from 1954 to 1984; while NATO 
went on to become one of the most successful defensive alliances in history. However, 
the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in July 1991 and that of the Soviet Union 
in December 1991 - historically the main external challenges for NATO - led Alliance 
governments to question the single-minded focus on collective defense that made the 
Atlantic Alliance so successful during the Cold War. Indeed, the new post-Cold war era 
has necessitated a reevaluation of Alliance commitments and burden-sharing 
responsibilities by governments on both sides of the Atlantic. 
In December 1991, the WEU's Maastricht Declaration established a renewed 
emphasis on developing the role of the WEU as a means to strengthen the European Pillar 
within the Atlantic Alliance. Two years later, in November 1993, the Treaty on European 
Union entered into force and chartered the "implementation of a common foreign and 
security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might 
in time lead to a common defense."6 In addition, the EU also envisioned the 
implementation of its defense initiatives through the WEU. In response to the EU's 
5 Treaty signed at Paris on 23 October 1954. WEU Secretariat General, "Treaty of Economic, social and 
cultural collaboration, and collective self-defence at Brussels on 17 March 1948 as amended by the 
'Protocols modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty" in Western European Union, Available [Online]: 
[http://www.weu.intleng/docU/d541023a.htm]. September 1998. 
6 Treaty signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992. European Commission, "Title I, Article B of Treaty on 
European Union" in Europa, Available [Online]: [http://europa.eu.intlabc/treaties/en/entr2b.htm#12], 
September 1998. 
3 
mandate for a more visible European role in the security of Europe, NATO leaders fully 
endorsed the emergence and development of the ESDI through a revitalized WEU 
working within NATO at the January 1994 Alliance summit. Although it has yet to enter 
into force (because it has still not been ratified by all members of the EU), the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty will take another step, although a very limited one, towards the 
development of a supranational CFSP among the European nations. As a result, the 
WEU would maintain a "curious" dual status serving on the one hand "as a means to 
strengthen the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance" while, on the other, concurrently 
authenticating the CFSP "as the defense arm of the European Union."7 
Each of the three major Western European powers retains a historical national 
character, continuing aspirations for a place in Europe and the world, and a vision of the 
future security architecture of Europe, all of which could greatly influence the evolution 
of NATO's European Pillar and the development of the ESDI within the WEU and the 
EU. Near-term success in establishing a coherent ESDI depends on the harmonization of 
separate national voices into one dominant European voice with respect to the handling of 
"humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks;[and] tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peacemaking."8 
Yet, the long-term goal of shaping a fully comprehensive ESDI may still be 
beyond the grasp of leaders in London, Paris, and BonniBerlin because of their energetic 
7 European Commission, "Declaration (No 30) on Western European Union" in Europa, Available 
[Online]: [http://europa.eu.intiabc/treaties/enleur4b.htIn#Declaration_30], September 1998. 
8 Western European Union, Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, Available [Online]: 
[http://www.weu.intleng/info/maastricht.htm#2]. November 1998. 
4 
protection of intrinsic powers associated with national sovereignty. Sir Michael Howard 
has stated that the sentiments of national self-consciousness in Britain, France, and 
Germany have been determined largely by "conflict and contrast with one another."9 
This pattern of "conflict and contrast" has been most conspicuous when discussions at the 
highest political levels have turned towards the challenges of creating a combined 
European nuclear posture through the coordination (or hypothetically unification) of the 
British and French national nuclear forces in support of an autonomous European Pillar. 
This thesis examines the barriers that the major Western European powers must 
overcome to achieve success in the area of nuclear deterrent cooperation, an element that 
would be essential in a truly comprehensive ESDI. To satisfy this purpose, the policies of 
Britain, France and Germany are examined to highlight variances within each country's 
notion of the European project, the development of the ESDI within the WEU, and the 
eventual framing of a CFSP for the EU. Furthermore, each country's policies with 
respect to nuclear weapons, relations with the other two major Western European powers, 
and bilateral relations with the United States are also assessed. 
In Chapter n, Britain's place in post-Cold War Europe is analyzed. Traditionally, 
Britain has been reluctant to accept its role in the European integration movement and has 
placed more political emphasis on maintaining its special relationship with the US than 
on the development of more intimate relations with Europe. The development of the 
British deterrent in the wake of the 1962 Skybolt affair was influenced by the special 
9 Sir Michael Howard, "A Europe of Three: The Historical Context," in Parameters XXIV, no. 4 (Winter 
1994-95): 41. 
5 
Anglo-American nuclear partnership that began during World War ll. In fact, the British 
independent nuclear deterrent, with the "supreme national interests" caveat, has been 
dedicated to a deterrence role for NATO since 1962. Therefore, one must ask, how likely 
are the British to abandon their Atlanticist perspective and the special relationship with 
the US for the unknown qualities of a deeper relationship with fellow Europeans and 
r 
nuclear assurances within the EUIWEU context? 
In Chapter ill, the role of France in the new Europe is assessed. How will France 
balance its Europeanist agenda against the Atlanticist tendencies of the other two 
principal Western European countries? What does this mean for the nuclear dimension of 
European construction? As a leader of the European integration movement and the chief 
advocate for a fully autonomous ESDI, France's ambition to lead Europe has called for a 
more European security structure in hopes of creating a true ESDI - implicitly, one 
devoid of American influence and led by the French. Under President Charles de Gaulle, 
the assertion of the French nuclear deterrent's operational independence was seen as a 
means to restore national pride, which was badly wounded by France's military failures in 
1940. The withdrawal of French military forces from NATO's integrated military 
command structure in 1966 illustrated the contentious politics between France and the US 
regarding NATO issues during the 1960s. Within the last decade, French security policy, 
which preaches the independence of French military forces and strategy, has slowly given 
way to a more European approach as highlighted by President Mitterand's call for a 
single European nuclear doctrine in 1992 or the vague offers to devise a European 
dissuasion concertee involving the French deterrent in 1995. 
6 
Chapter IV examines the following questions vis-a.-vis Germany. What is the role 
of a resurgent, unified Germany in the continuing evolutionary development of the WEU? 
Does Germany's reliance on US nuclear assurances impede efforts to pursue a nuclear 
dimension in European construction? Would a nuclear dimension in European 
construction necessarily mean a nuclear-armed Germany or just German participation in a 
European Nuclear Planning Group? Or would it mean that Germany would become an 
entity within a European Union that had become a single sovereign state? Germany, a 
non-nuclear weapons state by treaty and barred as a result of certain interpretations of its 
"Basic Law" of deploying military forces outside and beyond NATO's defensive 
missions and area of responsibility until 1994, has been playing the part of an inhibited 
European partner. The fear of a resurgent and nationalistic Germany dominating Europe 
has influenced domestic and foreign leaders to find ways to constrain ~ and in some areas 
to limit - Germany's power and influence on the continent. Long since comfortable 
playing the role as Europe's economic giant and political dwarf, Germany is beginning to 
exhibit signs of breaking through the political inhibitions and normalizing its foreign and 
security policies. Indeed, the substantial economic and political clout wielded by 
Germany within the European integration process may foreshadow the eventual return of 
the continental power. 
Chapter V analyzes the interrelationships of the three major Western European 
powers, specifically focusing on their policies and bilateral relationships with respect to 
the creation of a multilateral European nuclear deterrent. The creation of such a deterrent 
would create new challenges for European strategic planning and provide a degree of 
7 
great power status for the supranational leadership within the European Union and the 
Western European Union. However, how likely is the creation of a multilateral European 
nuclear deterrent given the concerns in some circles with respect to the legitimacy of 
nuclear weapons, the role of European national nuclear forces, and the role of the United 
States in providing nuclear deterrence for its allies in Europe? The evolution of the 
Atlantic Alliance and the character of the transatlantic relationship seem dependent on the 
level of development and integration of the WEU within or outside of NATO. Therefore, 
what would be the implications of a structurally and operationally mature WEU - one 
with a fully developed command and control structure backed by the authority of 
combined arrangements for European nuclear weapons - for the United States, NATO, 
and the transatlantic relationship? 
Since the Maastricht Treaty chartered the creation of a CFSP, the performances of 
the WEU on the international stage - such as minesweeping operations in the Persian 
Gulf and embargo operations in the Adriatic Sea - have been of relatively limited scope. 
More recently, policy paralysis vis-a-vis Kosovo has again exposed the difficulty of 
finding the lowest common denominator among WEU nations in terms of a coherent and 
cohesive European position. Similarly, the crisis in Albania again highlighted the 
challenges in achieving a consensus among the Europeans and resulted only in a "purely 
ad hoc coalition of the able and the willing, without any institutional role being played 
politically or militarily by the WEU."10 
10 Fran90is Heisbourg, "European Attitudes toward NATO Out-Of-Area Operations," paper presented at 
the National Defense University - European Seminar for ''NATO 2010: A Strategic Vision," February 
1998, 13. 
8 
These same difficulties and inhibitions may hinder the governments of Britain, 
France, and Germany in pursuing the necessary qualities of an ESDI within NATO via 
the WEU and the eventual framing of a CFSP for the European Union. This lack of 
political and military cohesion may impede any progress towards nuclear deterrent 
cooperation among the major Western European powers under the auspices of the WEU. 
Furthermore, the lack of a European nuclear dimension may render a fully autonomous 
CFSP for the EU impractical due to NATO Europe's continued reliance on US nuclear 
commitments. However, if a fully autonomous European CFSP were ever realized, a 
truly united Europe - backed by the capabilities provided by nuclear weapons - would 
have significant implications for the US, the transatlantic relationship, and the future role 
of the Atlantic Alliance in the security of the new Europe in the twenty-first century. 
9 
10 
II. BRITAIN: THE RELUCTANT PARTNER 
For four hundred years, the foreign policy of England has been to oppose 
the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating power on the continent, 
and particularly to prevent the Low Countries falling into the hands of 
such a Power .... Here is the wonderful unconscious tradition of British 
foreign policy. 11 
Winston S. Churchill 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As was evident in Britain's response to the hegemonic aspirations of Philip ~, 
Louis XIV, Napoleon Bonaparte, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Adolf Hitler, British leaders 
have demonstrated an inclination towards balance of power diplomacy to maintain the 
political status quo in continental Europe. Historically, British leaders have felt impelled 
to counter attempts by major European powers seeking to achieve "an overlordship of 
Europe"12 by maintaining the balance of power equilibrium. In fact, "Imperial Britain's 
strategy was to capitalize on its great advantage of insularity - to stay aloof from th~ 
quarrels of Europe, if possible, and to intervene against the hegemonist of the day when 
necessary." 13 
During the Cold War, German political disabilities, the French preoccupation with 
autonomy, and the special relationship with the United States helped maintain the 
political status quo in Europe while propping up Britain's great power status. However, 
in the post-Cold War era, the implosion of the Soviet Union and attempts to build up a 
11 Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948),207-208. 
12 Ibid, 208. 
13 Josef Joffe, "How America Does It," Foreign Affairs 76, no.25 (September/October 1997): 16. 
11 
supranational EUIWEU governing body based in Brussels have forced Britain to 
reconsider its station within Europe. Although the British have become "reconciled to the 
United Kingdom's inability to maintain the status of a major world power," David 
Greenwood also noted that the security and stature provided by an "independent" 
deterrent still remains a high value card held closely within the political hand of British 
leaders because Britain still "aspires to cut a certain kind of figure in international affairs 
- that of a leading regional power with a global vision."14 
B. BRITAIN'S PLACE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN IDEA 
Britain remains reluctant to accept at face value the appropriateness of deeper 
integration in political, economic and military affairs within the European Union. Indeed, 
some changes in the European security order would not serve British interests; they 
would undennine Britain's privileged standing by further weakening its position.15 As 
the EU countries continue gradually along the road towards building a comprehensive 
supranational entity, "the characteristic British response to grand visions of a European 
future is to worry about the details ... and to insist that the participants address the 
14 David Greenwood, "The United Kingdom," in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., The Defense 
Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, 3d edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1994),280-283. 
15 James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, Recasting the European Order: Security Architectures and 
Economic Cooperation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997),238. 
12 
practical issues before signing up to more ambitious schemes."16 In regards to the British 
vision of the European movement, Michael Clarke has noted that British leaders often 
avoid answering questions and that policy in this area remains solely a tactful critique of 
the process because "policy is in essence critiquing the process."17 
Currently, the dilemma that confronts British policymakers is how to integrate 
alternative security European institutions within the NATO framework that, as noted 
within the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, "has been a uniquely effective political and 
military security alliance for half a century."18 In fact, the British remain "loath to 
entertain any architectural design that appears to diminish the primacy of NATO or 
threatens to attenuate the connection between the United States and European security."19 
In spite of their penchant for wrangling over the details of European integration, British 
leaders maintain an acute awareness of what must by preserved in. any future security 
architecture for a new Europe. From London's perspective, the indispensable elements of 
any discussion on Western European security affairs remain the continued involvement of 
the US and NATO in European security matters; the preservation of the so-called 
"special" relationship between Britain and the US; and the protection of the intrinsic 
rights of national sovereignty.20 
16 Michael Clarke, "Britain," in Michael Brenner, ed., NATO and Collective Security (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, Inc., 1998), 7. 
17 Ibid., 7. 
18 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, July 1998, para 37. 
19 Sperling and Kirchner, 239. 
20 Clarke, 9-11. 
13 
During the 1996 Labour party convention, Tony Blair emphasized his belief in the 
revolutionary impact that the new Labour party could play within Europe: "[l]eading 
Britain into an age of achievement means Britain leading Europe ... [therefore] we will 
build a new 'relationship with Europe."21 Mter the Labour Party's successful ascent to 
the majority as a result of the 1997 elections, Prime Minister Blair vowed to maneuver 
Britain towards smoother and more productive relationships with France and Germany. 
Blair's emphasis was on recasting Britain as an equal partner. In his vision, Britain 
would strengthen a strategic triangle made up of Europe's "Big Three." In fact, the 
British tour of duty in the Presidency of the EU in 1998 was seen as an opportunity for 
Britain to demonstrate strong leadership in order to show Europeans (mainly the French 
and the Germans) that the British were no longer "reluctant" members of Europe. 
However, the "October 1997 flip flops on British EMU policy"22 have not made it 
any easier to erase London's historical reluctance towards deeper integration within the 
EU and WEU from the memories of leaders in both Paris and BonnlBerlin. At the time, 
the decision to opt out of the monetary union - the EU's most ambitious project to date -
saddled Britain with a lack of credibility and effectively denied it any political leverage to 
affect internal debates on the "course and speed" of integration. In May 1998, the "last-
minute quarrel between Germany, France, and the Netherlands over the choice of a 
president for the new European Central Bank" served to highlight "Britain's general 
awkwardness in Europe ... [because] Britain was called upon to settle a fight that was not 
21 Tony Blair quoted in Anne Applebaum, "Tony Blair and the New Left," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 
(March/AprilI997): 57. 
22 Jane M. O. Sharp, "Will Britain Lead Europe?" The World Today 53, no. 12 (December 1997): 39. 
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of its own making, over the management of a currency that Britain itself has for now 
decided not to join."23 According to Dominique MOlsi, since "it will take years for 
London to behave in a truly European manner. .. a club of three is not about to replace a 
club of two" as the political motor of European integration.24 At the conclusion of his 
six-month term, Prime Minister Blair openly recognized that his vision of making Britain 
a more influential player within the European Union "could take 10 years."25 Hence, 
Britain - even under Blair's leadership - is still not perceived by leaders in France and 
Germany as a fully engaged European partner. 
C. POLICIES TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN 
SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY 
The British support for the creation of ESDI as a means to strengthen the 
European pillar within NATO is driven by two narrow objectives: to prevent the US from 
withdrawing from Europe over "corrosive burden-sharing debates ... [and] to extend 
British influence over the security policies of its major European allies."26 In 1990, 
Philip A. G. Sabin noted that the British position within the political debates over 
European integration has historically tended "to support only minor amendments to the 
23 "Tony Blair's Waterloo," The Economist, 13 June 1998,56. 
24 Dominique MOlsi, "Europe's odd couple endures," The Prague Post, 20 May 1998. 
25 Robert Posten, "Blair order review of the UK role in Europe, PM's ambition of powerful presence in EU 
'could take 10 years'," The Financial Times (London), 1 July 1998,1. 
26 Sperling and Kirchner, 238. 
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status quo and to resist suggestions from other allies for more radical changes."27 Eight 
years later, British planners (and for that matter other Europeans) still advance differing 
attitudes concerning the future direction and magnitude of greater European integration. 
However, the British perspective on where the primary political-military decision-making 
within European security affairs should reside has remained consistent. Britain maintains 
that NATO has always been the foundation of effective allied military cooperation in 
Europe and still remains "highly relevant to the specific circumstances of Europe 
today."28 Although the WEU plays "an important role in fostering defense co-operation 
amongst its members in conflict prevention and particularly peacekeeping,"29 the 
evolution of the WEU seems to represent in British eyes a potential challenge to the unity 
of the Atlantic Alliance. Expressing similar sentiments, Sir Michael Howard noted that 
the contribution of the WEU towards the development of NATO's European Pillar 
"seems to [them] at best redundant, at worst a deliberate challenge to the United States to 
leave the Europeans to fend for themselves."30 
British officials point to the logical consequences of the current attempts at a 
common monetary policy as the eventual framing of a CFSP that in tum may lead to a 
common defense policy for all of the European Union. The British position that a CFSP 
27 Philip A. G. Sabin, British Strategic Priorities in the 1990s, Adelphi Papers 254 (London: The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990),37. 
28 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, July 1998, para 38. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Sir Michael Howard, "A Europe of Three: The Historical Context," Parameters XXIV, no.4 (Winter 
1994-95): 47. 
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should not necessarily produce or lead to a common defense policy reflects a preference 
that the WEU retain its intergovernmental character, remain independent of the EU, and 
remain subordinated to NATO}1 Indeed, the inherent responsibilities associated with 
national defense evoke symbols and rights of national sovereignty that push the British to 
ask, Which European countries are prepared to give up national control over defense and 
foreign policy? As Michael Clarke has noted, for France and Germany to give up 
intrinsic rights of sovereignty in national defense remains "inconceivable to officialdom 
in London" and in any case "[t]he British themselves have no expectation of doing so in 
the foreseeable future."32 
D. THE BRITISH "INDEPENDENT" DETERRENT 
In view of Britain's political and military rank in international politics after World 
War II, the British government took it virtually for granted that Britain acted in 
accordance with its rights and responsibilities in acquiring nuclear weapons. In fact, 
nuclear historians have stated that the British drive to develop nuclear weapons was a 
product of several factors: (1) Nuclear weapons were needed to safeguard Britain's "vital 
interests" by countering the threat of the Soviet nuclear arsenal; (2) Nuclear weapons 
offered a means for a "second-tier" state to achieve (or maintain, in the case of Britain) 
great power status; and (3) The Atomic Energy Act (McMahon Act) of 1946 restricted 
access to US atomic information, placing into question British reliance on the American 
31 Sperling and Kirchner, 240. 
32 Clarke, 9-11. 
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nuclear program.33 Regardless of why the British sought nuclear weapons, the fact is that 
the British nuclear weapons program led by William Penney designed and successfully 
developed a nuclear weapon. The concepts which would lead to the eventual 
development of an "independent" British deterrent were validated as a result of the 
Hurricane atomic weapons testing conducted at the Monte Bello islands in October 
1952.34 Thus, Britain became the third state - after the United States and the USSR - to 
achieve membership within the nuclear "club." 
Since the 1954 amendments to the McMahon Act allowed only very limited 
exchanges of atomic information with the United States, Britain might have considered a 
joint venture alongside France in the development of their separate nuclear weapons 
programs. However, a strategic partnership with the more developed US atomic weapons 
program afforded Britain more benefits than a relationship with the French atomic 
program, then still in the first stages of development, would have provided at the time. ill 
any case, the nuclear aspects of Britain's "special" relationship with the US started to 
gain political momentum towards greater cooperation in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez 
Crisis. By October 1957, when the Soviets launched Sputnik, nuclear cooperation 
between the US and Britain was well underway. 
In 1957, three separate meetings laid the foundation for increased collaboration 
between the American and British nuclear weapons programs. The first meeting, in 
33 Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook: British, 
French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Vol V (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), 19. 
34 Ibid., 24. 
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January/February 1957, was between US Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson and British 
Secretary of State for Defence Duncan Sandys. Set in Washington, the discussions 
centered on the adaptation of British bombers to carry US nuclear weapons, storage of US 
nuclear bombs on British territory, and the coordination of targets between the US 
Strategic Air Command and the British Bomber Command. The second meeting, held on 
Bermuda in March 1957, was between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister 
Macmillan. This meeting resulted in the publicly announced decision to deploy US Thor 
missiles to Britain, as well as a secret annex covering prior consultation on testing 
initiatives. A common policy toward French nuclear ambitions was also part of the 
Bermuda agenda.35 The third meeting, held in Washington during October 1957, resulted 
in Eisenhower and Macmillan agreeing to a "Declaration of Common Purpose" which 
marked commitments to greater nuclear cooperation between the US and Britain. 
As a consequence of the meetings in 1957, amendments to the McMahon Act 
were passed by the US Congress, paving the way for the 1958 Agreement for Cooperation 
on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. Entering into force in 
August 1958, the agreement allowed: cooperation on design, testing, and fabrication of. 
nuclear weapons; the development of defense plans; training of personnel in employment 
of, and defense against, atomic weapons; the evaluation of potential enemies; and the 
research, development and design of military reactors. 36 
35 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, 43. 
36 Ibid., 46. 
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In May 1959, the 1958 Agreement was further amended to allow the transfer of 
nuclear weapons equipment and materials along with US atomic information. ill April 
1960, the British government announced the cancellation of the Blue Streak ballistic 
missile project, as well as the intention to purchase the US Skybolt air-launched ballistic 
missile. The abrupt cancellation of the Skybolt program without prior consultation with 
the British again placed Anglo-American relations on precarious footing. However, the 
meetings in December 1962 between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan 
at Nassau in the Bahamas helped to quell the antagonism and led to the subsequent 
transfer of Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 
As it has since its operational beginnings, the "British government continues to 
present the UK deterrent as primarily a contribution to the NATO Alliance."37 Britain's 
nuclear strategy is based on a readiness to use nuclear weapons to defend British "vital 
interests" in the event of a nuclear attack or an overwhelming conventional weapons 
attack against NATO Europe. Another rationale that was articulated to support the 
necessity for a British deterrent was that of a second center of nuclear decision-making, 
which provided an element of nuclear weapons autonomy to. hedge against US 
isolationism or indecisiveness with respect to American nuclear commitments.38 Taken 
together, both rationales provided a justification for an "independent" nuclear deterrent 
37 Nicholas K. J. Witney, "British Nuclear Policy After the Cold War," in Survival 36, no. 4 (Winter 1994-
95): 104. 
38 Michael Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, Whitehall Papers 41 (London: Royal United 
Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1997), 75. 
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while also characterizing Britain's role as a nuclear weapons state in broader and more 
palatable terms for British citizens than narrow national self-interest. 
Despite US nuclear commitments, there was always a risk that the Soviet Union 
might be tempted into aggression in Europe by the calculation that the US would choose 
to withhold its strategic deterrent capabilities rather than face nuclear retaliation from the 
Soviets on the North American contin~nt. This theory does not offer to any evidence of 
US unreliability; however, as Nicholas K. J. Witney noted, "it was enough to establish 
that there was a gamble that the Soviets might conceivably be tempted to take. "39 The 
theory of a second center of decision-making attributes to Britain the ability to influence 
scenarios in such a manner that Kremlin strategists have to take notice of the leadership 
in London. Consequently, the Soviet Union would "feel less sanguine about discounting 
the possibility of nuclear retaliation from a European power, arguably more threatened by,. 
and certainly geographically much closer to invasion across Europe's central front."40 
Therefore, the existence of the independent British nuclear deterrent was justified as a 
means to cover up a potential "chink in the Alliance's armor" which the Soviets might 
otherwise have been tempted to try to. exploit. However, with the demise of the Soviet 
Union, Witney also noted that "the specific second centre justification is becoming 
increasingly hard to make with real conviction ... [because] the palpable threat to Western 
Europe has all but disappeared."41 
39Nicholas K. J. Witney, The British Nuclear Deterrent after the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 1995),9. 
40Ibid.,9. 
41 Witney, "British Nuclear Policy After the Cold War," 104. 
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For Britain, operational independence (the ability of the Prime Minister to 
independently control the British nuclear deterrent) rather than full independence in areas 
such as research, development, and procurement matters has always been sufficient. 
Provided that this minimum operational independence remains secure, Britain appears 
content to cooperate with the US in vital areas related to the construction and 
maintenance of its nuclear deterrent. Cooperation between the US and Britain regarding 
development, testing, and production of nuclear materials is at such high levels that the 
withdrawal of US support (piecemeal or whole) would have placed the sustainability of 
the British deterrent in a perilous position. Indeed, even the potential withdrawal of US 
nuclear support would place heavy strains on the British treasury, especially "with the 
huge costs of ensuring against it by doing everything 'in-house' ."42 This scenario 
remains far from reality because, according to a 1985 US State Department report, "The 
US talks more often, more candidly, and on more subjects with the UK than with any 
other country. The complexity of Anglo-American ties is so immense as to defy easy 
characterization. Cooperation in strategic systems is so close, in fact, that the British 
have found it virtually impossible to work in this field with the French despite their 
periodic desire to do so."43 
42 Witney, The British Nuclear Deterrent after the Cold War, 115. 
43 Department of State, Report No 1120-AR, 10 July 1985, cited in Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, 51. 
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The British Trident program provides an excellent example of the close nuclear 
cooperation between Britain and the United States. The United Kingdom has relied 
centrally on the SLBMs - Polaris followed by Trident - procured from the United 
States.44 Not long after the July 1980 announcement by the British government of its 
intention to purchase the Trident I (C4) SLBM, the US decided to upgrade to the Trident 
II (D5) SLBM. Consequently, the British government (which had decided to follow suit 
in November 1981) announced the decision in March 1982.45 The government's stated 
reason for choosing to upgrade to the Trident II (D5) SLBM was to maintain 
commonality with US equipment over the lifetime of the system rather than to acquire a 
more powerful system with options for more warheads and greater accuracy.46 With the 
withdrawal from operational service of the WE-I?? free-fall nuclear bomb in April 1998, 
Britain will rely solely on the deterrent capabilities provided by a planned force of four 
44 Michael Quinlan, "British Nuclear Weapons Policy," in John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds., 
Strategic Views/rom the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies 0/ France, Britain and China (New 
Brunswick, ME: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 128. 
45Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, 115. 
46Ibid., 117. 
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Trident strategic missile nuclear submarines (See Table I) with approximately 160 
nuclear warheads in stockpile.47 
















Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1998-1999 
With the launching of HMS VENGEANCE, the last of the Vanguard Class Trident 
SSBNs, in prospect, British Secretary of State for Defence George Robertson commented 
that "Trident should meet our needs well into the next century, [therefore] there is no 
work under way to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons."48 
The British Trident D5 SLBMs are identical to those used by the US strategic 
submarine force. The British-designed and British-produced warhead is very similar to 
the US W76 warhead designed for the Trident I (C4) SLBM. In fact, there are no specific 
American or British missiles because all the missiles are part of a pool held at the US 
Naval Submarine Base at King's Bay, Georgia. The British will have the title to a certain 
number of the missiles; but, they do not actually own any specific missiles. A missile 
that is deployed on a US SSBN may at some later time serve on a British SSBN and vice 
47 William Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Joshua Handler, Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployment 
1998 (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense CounCil, 1998),39. 
48 United Kingdom, House of Commons, written answers for 28 July 1998. 
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versa. The 1982 decision by the British Ministry of Defence to refurbish the Trident 
missiles at King's Bay vice the Royal Naval Armament Depot at Coulport was to avoid 
the expense of duplicate nuclear weapons storage, handling and maintenance 
infrastructures.49 
Following the abandonment of the "sub-strategic" roles by the Royal Navy and the 
British Army in 1992-1993 and the Royal Air Force in 1998, the British planned to fill 
the void by deploying some of their Trident II SLBMs in a "sub-strategic" role. 50 The 
intention not to use the full capacity of the Trident system due to the present calmer 
international strategic environment has allowed the development of a number of sub-
strategic options.51 Concerning this "flexibility in the choice of yield for the warheads in 
the Trident missile,"52 George Robertson commented: 
The credibility of our minimum nuclear deterrent requires that.we have the 
option, in extreme self-defence, of deterring further aggression through a 
nuclear ("sub-strategic") strike which is limited in scale and nature of 
target so that it could not be expected automatically to lead to a full scale 
nuclear exchange. 53 
According to a Defence Select Committee report, "[t]here is no technical reason why 
Trident missiles should not carry out the 'sub-strategic' role, by firing a single missile 
carrying one warhead, whose target could be communicated to a submarine at sea ... The 
49 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, 117. 
50 Ibid., 113. 
51 CAPT Richard Sharpe, OBE RN, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1998-1999 (Surrey, UK: Jane's Information 
Group Limited, 1998), 755. 
52 United Kingdom, House of Commons, written answers, 19 March 1998. 
53 United Kingdom, House of Commons, written answers, 24 July 1998. 
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major constraint arises from the need to decide on a particular weapon outload when the 
submarine is in port."54 
UK governments have taken the political stance that force levels for the British 
deterrent were set at the minimum needed for their politico-strategic purposes. Therefore, 
the level was not a function of the levels of other countries' offensive forces and there 
was no logical case for any particular numerical relationship.55 Moreover, UK nuclear 
weapons systems were never included in SALT or START negotiations. The 1998 
Strategic Defense Review conducted "a rigorous re-examination of [British] deterrence 
requirements" and concluded that deterrence "does not depend on the size of other 
nation's arsenals, but on the minimum necessary to deter any threat to our [British] vital 
interests."56 
E. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
The British ability "to punch above their weight" is largely derived from the 
British military's ability to project power in a global sense while leaning on its privileged 
position within NATO. In the Atlantic Alliance, the US remains a key factor in meeting 
the political-military challenges of building "a new world order to allow the advanced 
economies of the world to function without constant interruption and threat from the third 
54 Ibid., 132. 
55 Quinlan, "British Nuclear Weapons Policy," 129. 
56 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, July 1998, para. 62. 
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world."57 London continues to believe that the capitals of Western Europe need 
Washington to remain critically engaged within European security affairs, and the British 
always seem to do their best to keep the Americans in and to dissuade them from going 
away. Peregrine Worsthorne has noted that "[i]n the foreseeable future there will be only 
one superpower capable of rising to this challenge - the United States - and only one 
European power able to give instant support - Britain .... A United Europe would be 
quite useless in this new world order where a speedy willingness to use force is of the 
essence."58 Although no longer in office, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's 
words retain their usefulness in describing the "special" relationship: 
Such are the realities of population, resources, technology, and capital that 
if America remains the dominant power in a united West and militarily 
engaged in Europe, then the West can continue to be the dominant power 
in the world as a whole. Understanding and accepting this will always be 
easier for us in Britain than for our European neighbors. The Anglo-
American relationship is not some outdated romantic notion. It reflects 
shared history, language, values, and ideals - the very things that 
generate the willingness for sacrifice on which the outcome of every 
military venture ultimately depends. 59 
Britain clearly wants to maintain the "special" relationship it currently enjoys with 
the United States in naval, nuclear, and intelligence matters. Since the end of World War 
n, Britain has tried to have the best of both worlds by maintaining this privileged bilateral 
security relationship, while at the same time becoming part of the integration process of 
57 Peregrine Worsthorne, "What kind of People?" The National Interest, no. 22 (Winter 1990/91): 99. 
58 Ibid.;99. 
59 Margaret Thatcher, "The Present Danger," in Hoover Digest, no. 1 (1998), an adaptation from an 
address given to the First International Conservative Congress, Washington, D.C., September 28, 1997. 
Available [Online]: [http://www-hoover.stanford.eduJpublications/digestl9811thatcher .html], July 1998. 
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Europe. However, as Lawrence Freedman has noted, "the uncoupling of the US nuclear 
arsenal from European security is now a much more serious prospect than it has ever 
been, but precisely for that reason the British government does not want to start talking of 
American disengagement as a foregone conclusion."60 Therefore, British leaders have 
approached the issue of a cooperative European nuclear policy "not as an alternative to 
the nuclear defense umbrella provided by the US and NATO but only as a supplementary 
contribution to the strengthening of cohesiveness throughout the Western European 
security landscape."61 
The overall importance of the British role as the transatlantic link between Europe 
and America - like the once vast and formidable British Empire - has been in a steady 
continuing decline. The Clinton administration has urged Prime Minister Blair and the 
Labour majority to pursue a larger leadership role within Europe as w~ll as a more active 
presence with regard to European integration. During his visit to Washington in February 
1998, Prime Minister Blair steadfastly expressed that Britain remains the "bridge between 
the US and Europe." British leaders desire to reinforce the belief among their European 
counterparts that Britain has a special place as the intermediary or bridge to the United 
States, and this approach "confers greater status on Britain vis-a-vis France and Germany 
than London has within the EU, where it is a late-coming and frequently reluctant 
60 Lawrence Freedman, "Britain and Nuclear Weapons," in Michael Clarke and Philip Sabin, eds., British 
Defence Choices for the Twenty-First Century (London and New York: Brassey, 1993),220. 
61 Rebecca Johnson, British Perspectives on the Future of Nuclear Weapons, Occasional Paper no. 37 
(Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1998),27. 
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partner."62 Blair also resisted notions that the British "special" relationship with America 
and the perception of bias toward Atlanticism would jeopardize the British 
rapprochement with Europe.63 Still, acting in the role as America's interlocutor with 
Europe, Blair has occasionally issued "Thatcher-like warnings against American 
'wobbliness' in world and European affairs."64 
F. FINAL REMARKS 
Given British strategic culture and the manner in which the British nuclear 
deterrent forces were developed, the British are not likely in the near future to forsake 
their Atlanticist viewpoints and the "special" relationship with the US for the unknown 
qualities of a deeper European relationship. As Lawrence Freedman has noted, "[British] 
nuclear weapons remain little more that a hedge against an uncertain future. The 
inclination is to keep them well clear of any conflict in which it is likely to be involved 
where the future of western Europe is not directly at stake."65 In any case, British nuclear 
forces will continue their traditional role as an "independent" deterrent serving within the 
integrated NATO nuclear force structure.66 
62 Johnson, British Perspectives on the Future of Nuclear Weapons, 28. 
63 Warren Hoge, "From a Friend Indeed, Clinton Awaits a Visit," The New York Times, 3 February 1998, 
A3. 
64 "Partial Victory," The Economist, 4 July 1998, 52. 
65 Freedman, "Britain and Nuclear Weapons," 237. 
66 Johnson, British Perspectives on the Future of Nuclear Weapons, 27. 
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Ultimately, lingering doubts concerning French and German motives within the 
European integration effort and issues of national sovereignty regarding the relinquishing 
of control over national nuclear forces to a supranational EUIWEU governing authority 
will certainly ensure that the British reluctance to greater integration will continue. 
However, the fundamental British dilemma vis-a-vis the creation of a more substantial 
British presence within the European Union still draws its foremost reasoning from what 
Luigi Barzini has noted: 
[W]hen one asks a Briton, any Briton, pointblank, 'Are you European?' 
the answer is always, 'European? Did you say European? Er, er' - a long 
thoughtful pause in which all other continents are mentally evoked and 
regretfully discarded - 'Yes, of course, I'm European.' This admission is 
pronounced without pride and with resignation.67 
67 Luigi Barzini, The Europeans (New York: Simon and Schuester, 1983),65. 
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m. FRANCE: THE AMBITIOUS PARTNER 
There is no France of worth, notably in the eyes of Frenchmen, without 
worldwide responsibility. That is why she does not approve of NATO, 
which does not allow France her proper role in decisions and which is 
limited to Europe. That is also why she is going to provide herself with an 
atomic armament. By that means, our defense and foreign policy will be 
able to be independent, on which we insist above all. 68 
Charles de Gaulle 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The French desire to maintain the nation's rank among the "great powers" of the 
world is an intrinsic element of France's strategic culture. The decision to create an 
"independent" nuclear weapons program, the status provided by a permanent seat on the 
United Nations Security Council, and territorial possessions that span across the entire 
globe all serve as expressions of "grandeur" for France. In the words of General Charles 
de Gaulle, "France cannot be France without grandeur."69 
The notion of France as a nuclear weapons state has been at the heart of the 
national self-definition since President Charles de Gaulle celebrated the detonation of 
France's frrst atomic bomb at Reganne (Algeria) on 13 February 1960, exclaiming 
"Hurrah for France! Since this morning, she is stronger and prouder."70 Indeed, the 
68 From Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs d'Espoir: Le Renouveau, 1958-1962 (Paris: PIon, 1970),221. 
Quoted in Wilfrid L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1971),355-356. 
69 De Gaulle quoted in David S. Yost, ''France,'' in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., The 
Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 236. 
70 Message to Under Secretary for Atomic Affairs Pierre Guillaumat, who was in attendance at the atomic 
test in Reganne. Quoted in Camille Grand, A French Nuclear Exception? Occasional Paper no. 38 
(Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1998),1. 
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distinctive elements of French national security remain ''the absolute need for 
independence in decision making, a refusal to accept subordination to the United States, 
the search for grandeur and rang, the primacy of the nation-state, and the importance of 
national defense."71 
However, France is a "great" nation, which peers back into its military history and 
notices a large share of defeats and disasters. The French place the blame for these 
military failures squarely on "being let down by others" and this perception has assumed 
the standing of ingrained national mythology in France. As a kind of remedy, Michael 
Quinlan has noted that nuclear weapons were essential because they are seen as the 
"grand equaliser" with which to deter stronger enemies and a guarantee that "France 
cannot be humiliated again."72 
B. FRANCE'S PLACE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN IDEA 
At times, France's aspiration to achieve grandeur on its own terms seems an odd 
fit when paired alongside its vision for "wider and deeper" integration within Europe. In 
Michael Howard's words, "France was in fact the first Great Nation - militarily, 
economically, and culturally - and has never forgotten it ... even today it is difficult to 
visit Paris without experiencing a sense of cultural inferiority .. . and the French 
themselves have no doubt that it is the greatest city in the centre of the most civilized 
71 Philip H. Gordon, A Cenain Idea of France (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
3. 
72 Michael Quinlan, Thinking about Nuclear Weapons, Whitehall Papers 41 (London: Royal United 
Services for Defence Studies, 1997),63. 
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country in the world."73 Within France, the "European" idea - from the confederal 
model envisioned by de Gaulle to the federal model preferred by Mitterrand - is seen as a 
means to "pursue France's past glory and power by multiplying its influence."74 
illustrating the existence of the "complementarity" between the competing visions of 
"grandeur" and "integration" within French diplomacy, Jolyon Howorth cites President de 
Gaulle's words in 1962: 
Owing to the fact that, for the first time in history, there are no longer any 
quarrels among European neighbours, France must help to build western 
Europe into an organised union of states so that, little by little, we can see 
the establishment, on either side of the Rhine, the Alps and perhaps the 
Channel, of an entity which, in political, economic, cultural and military 
terms will be the most powerful, prosperous and influential the world has 
ever seem.15 
In the near term, France's motivation to pursue an organized union of European 
states rests on maintaining (in the case of Germany) or deepening (in the case of Britain) 
close relations with the other members of Europe's "Big ~ree." "France likes to see 
itself as the connecting rod between two sets of bilateral relations [with Britain and 
Germany], to which [President] Chirac would eventually, he implies, like to give equal 
weight."76 However, when viewed from a longer perspective, France's view of the future 
73 Sir Michael Howard, "A Europe of Three: The Historical Context," in Parameters XXIV, no. 4 (Winter 
1994-95): 41. 
74 Dominique MOlsi, "The Trouble with France," in Foreign Affairs 77, no. 3 (May/June 1998): 100. 
75 De Gaulle quote from Discours et Messages, III (PIon, 1970),384. Cited in Joylon Howorth, ''France 
and European Security 1944-1994: Re-reading the Gaullist 'Consensus'," in Tony Chafer and Brian 
Jenkins, eds., France: From the Cold War to the New World Order (New York, St. Martin's Press, Inc;; 
1996),18. 
76 "France and Britain: Amour proper?," The Economist, 18 May 1996,52. 
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of European integration and its political stance regarding security and defense affairs 
within the new Europe places the EUIWEU nexus at the center of the European security 
order. Indeed, a mature WEU is seen as a means to forge "the primary connection 
between the western, central and eastern Europeans; to form the basis of a European 
defense identity that can strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; and to 
provide a basis for expanding NATO membership eastwards without transforming it into 
a military alliance aimed explicitly at the Russian Federation."77 
Despite a preference for autonomy in security and defense affairs, the French may 
be led to make compromises regarding their national sovereignty in an effort to ensure 
national security, avoid international isolation, and escape confinement to a clearly 
secondary rank in international politics. According to David S. Yost, "[m]any of the 
French are more prepared to accept integration in a West European defense framework in 
which they might have a pre-eminent role than integration in a NATO framework in 
which, many Frenchmen fear, France would be subordinated to the United States."78 
C. POLICIES TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN 
SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY 
Since the end of the Cold War, Paris has increasingly resented American attempts 
to preserve or even increase US influence in European security matters. In response to 
this resentment, the creation of a European Security and Defense Identity was viewed by 
77 James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, Recasting the European Order: Security Architectures and 
Economic Cooperation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997),249. 
78 Yost, ''France,'' 272. 
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the French as a means to challenge the dominance of the United States within NATO 
Europe. The security architecture preferred by France for a new Europe anticipates the 
development of an ESDI within the European Union. The WEU, to some degree, would 
be subordinated to, or (France's preference), be absorbed within, the European Union. 
Paris' blueprint for building an ESDI relies on the strength of the Franco-German couple 
to provide it political clout, as well as more extensive Anglo-French collaborative efforts 
in the field of nuclear deterrence cooperation. The French hope that both sets of bilateral 
relations will eventually provide "a basis for the creation of a European nuclear deterrent, 
without which European autonomy in the defense field is impossible."79 
Early on, French policies regarding the development of an ESDI were motivated 
by two factors: the collapse of the Soviet threat and the belief that the disengagement of 
US military forces from Europe was inevitable. Certainly, the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe, as well as within the former Soviet Union has provided a "low-risk" 
window of opportunity to "transform the European common market into a political union 
with responsibility for defense and security policy."80 Despite US assurances to the 
contrary, President Mitterrand expressed concern about the possibility of America's 
eventual return to traditional isolationist tendencies: ''We don't want to see American 
troops leave, but who knows what decisions will be made because of the economic 
79 Sperling and Kirchner, 246-247. 
80 Scott A. Harris and James B. Steinberg, European Defense and the Future of Transatlantic Cooperation 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993),45. 
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difficulties facing the American leadership?,,81 Due to the increased likelihood of a 
return by the Americans to some form of isolationism, Europeans (mainly in France) felt 
it essential on political and military grounds to develop European military capabilities 
that could fill any void left by the United States. 
However, the French approach to ESDI has evolved since the initial pressures of 
domestic political and international events leading to the debates at Maastricht in 1991. 
Indeed, France's new interest in developing ESDI within NATO received its motivation 
from several factors: the unification of Germany, the realization of the real value of the 
Atlantic Alliance as demonstrated during the Gulf War and the Bosnia conflict; and the 
political reality that attempting to develop ESDI outside of NATO was garnering little 
support in the rest of Europe. 82 
D. THE FRENCH NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCE 
By the end of the 1950s, a decade marked by unsuccessful military actions in 
colonial wars and the loss of political face in the 1956 Suez crisis, the French government 
resolved to diminish its political-military dependence on the United States by developing 
an "independent" nuclear deterrent. By developing and harnessing the power and status 
provided by nuclear weapons, France expected to gain the ability to 
81 ''France, Germany Unveil Corps as Step Toward European Defense," The Washington Post, 23 May 
1992. 
82 Robert Grant, ''France's New Relationship with NATO," Survival 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 58-80. 
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deter aggression against the hexagon. The existence of the force de frappe - marked by 
the first operational nuclear Mirage IV bomber squadron in 1964 - was justified in the 
following terms: great power status, influence, independence, and national security. 
Moreover, nuclear weapons were considered symbols of technological and military 
prowess in the modem era and it was inconceivable to leaders in Paris that France not 
possess them.83 By earning France the respect of its allies and giving France a say in 
when to start or how to fight a nuclear war, the force de frappe allowed France to play the 
sort of leading role in the Atlantic Alliance that it felt it deserved. 84 
At the height of the East-West nuclear standoff, France's leaders believed that 
neither the Americans nor the Soviets would be willing to run the risk of total destruction 
as a result of a global nuclear weapons exchange and that they would attempt to limit any 
war to the European continent. In the words of General de Gaulle, "[a] great state which 
does not possess [nuclear weapons] does not command its own destiny."85 
Consequently, "[t]he only way to prevent this ... was for Europeans themselves (and this 
meant France) to possess atomic capabilities."86 Indeed, the very essence of French 
strategy has been to shun any thought of linking the use of nuclear weapons to actual 
military operations, except in the most extreme circumstances of an East-West war or 
83 Gordon also provided two additional reasons to justify the force de frappe: technological gains and a 
new "nuclear" role for the French army. Philip H. Gordon, "Charles de Gaulle and the Nuclear 
ReVOlution," Security Studies 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1995): 138. 
84 Ibid., 141. 
85 Charles de Gaulle, speech at Strasbourg on 23 November 1961 quoted in Ibid., 142. 
86 Ibid., 141-142. 
37 
another contingency in which France's independence or existence might be at stake. 
Instead, the French sought to deter an adversary from attacking French "vital interests" 
through what David Hagland calls "nuclear existentialism" - the mere existence of their 
nuclear arsenal. "In the case of France, the doctrine had a name that paid tribute to its 
adherence to nuclear existentialism, la dissuasion du Jaible au Jort (the deterrence of the 
strong by the weak)."87 
The French model for nuclear independence differs from the British model. The 
French nuclear program was a reflection of Gaullism by demonstrating France's strategic 
and technological independence from the United States. From initial weapons research to 
testing and production, France set out to construct an independent national nuclear 
weapons program. Notwithstanding the formidable technical challenges, the nuclear 
infrastructure requirements were enormous. According to Michael Quinlan, France 
"probably spent more than Britain by a factor of at least three or four, with heavy 
opportunity costs elsewhere."88 Indeed, the "price of independence" for a nuclear arsenal 
represented between 0.4 and 1.2 percent of the gross domestic product and took up 30 
percent of the defense budget annually for 30 years (1963-1992).89 . 
The result was a success in which France could take great pride, although the 
absolute purity of the French nuclear program from US technical assistance is a myth. 
87 David Haglund, ''France's Nuclear Posture: Adjusting to the Post-Cold War Era," Contemporary 
Security Policy 16, no. 2 (August 1995), 141. 
88 Quinlan, ''Thinking about Nuclear Weapons," 63. 
89 Camille Grand, A French Nuclear Exception?, Occasional Paper no. 38 (Washington, DC: The Henry L. 
Stimson Center, January 1998), 3. 
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According to a French commentator, Camille Grand, only "limited forms of cooperation" 
as a result of the 1961 US-France mutual defense agreement ever took place and 
"negative guidance" during the Nixon administration "remained on the whole very 
limited due to some American reluctance to cooperate extensively."90 However, 
"[a]ccording to former President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, technical exchanges with the 
United States have helped France with miniaturization, multiple warheads, and hardening 
against electromagnetic effects; but the independence of France's strategic conduct and 
decision making has never been placed into question by this cooperation."91 
In any case, acknowledging the existence of a US-France nuclear connection may 
make it possible for analysts in Paris and London to look deeper into questions 
concerning what type of nuclear force a "second-tier" nation should maintain and how 
much nuclear collaboration between the two is enough to support an autonomous 
European defense policy. Another by-product of acknowledging the American-French 
nuclear connection would be to facilitate efforts towards collaboration and coordination 
in nuclear matters between France and Britain - an element of a fully autonomous 
common foreign security policy for the European Union. 
Although the French triad (consisting of ballistic missile submarines, bombers and 
land-based missiles) has been cut back to a dyad consisting of only submarines and 
bombers, the nuclear deterrent force remains the centerpiece of France's military posture. 
The new Le Triomphant class ballistic missile submarine force will serve as the backbone 
90 Grand, A French Nuclear Exception?, 4. 
91 Giscard d'Estaing quoted in Yost, ''France,'' 245. 
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of France's strategic forces (See Table 2). However, due to the shrinking French military 
budget since the end of the Cold War, only four of the new generation SSBNs will be 
procured, instead of the six that had been envisioned originally. 
Table 2. Current and Planned French Ballistic Missile Submarine Force 
NAME 




LE TRIOMPHANT CLASS 
LE TRIOMPHANT (S616) 
LE TEMERAIRE (S617) 


















Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1998-1999 
The French SSBN force will consist of only 4 active submarines. This entails 
decommissioning the older L'Inflexible class ballistic missile submarines one by one as 
the newer Le Triomphant class ballistic missile submarines enter active service. In June 
1992, the Mitterrand government announced a significant shift in its nuclear operational 
doctrine. Instead of maintaining three SSBNs at sea at all times (as was French policy 
since January 1983), only two SSBNs will be required to be kept at sea in a "ready to 
fire" status. 
President Mitterrand's June 1992 announcement also lowered the alert levels for 
the second "leg" of the French deterrent which consists of dual capable aircraft of the 
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French Air Force and Navy.92 Since the retirement of the Mirage IVP strategic bomber 
in 1996, France's nuclear air ann has consisted of the Air Force's Mirage 2000N bomber 
and the Navy's Super Etendard carrier-based fighter-bomber, both aircraft equipped with 
the Air-Sol Moyenne Portee (ASMP) supersonic air-to-surface missile.93 
In the wake of German unification and the political situation in Eastern Europe, 
ground-based short-range nuclear systems have become politically difficult to sustain in 
France.94 The French Army's Pluton missiles were all withdrawn in 1992. The Hades 
missiles, originally planned as successors for the aging Plutons were never placed in 
active service; in February 1996 President Chirac announced that the 30 Hades missiles 
that had been produced and immediately placed in storage would all be dismantled. ill 
September 1996, 18 silo-based S-3D IRBM on the Plateau d' Albion were deactivated at a 
cost of $77.5 million. 95 
French politicians and analysts have argued that it remains important to preclude 
any situation that would leave Germany preoccupied with an apparent lack of nuclear 
protection or vulnerable to Russian nuclear coercion. In order to avert a gap between 
nuclear and non-nuclear EU members and to promote greater consensus with respect to 
nuclear deterrence, it has been suggested that France (along with Britain) must 
92 Yost, "France," 262-263. 
93 William Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Joshua Handler, Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployment 
1998 (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1998),44. 
94 Yost, ''France'', 262-263. 
95 Arkin, Norris, and Handler, 42. 
41 
demonstrate a preparedness to make the necessary concessions for a credible West 
European nuclear consultation arrangement. This line of reasoning may have fOImed the 
basis for President Mitterrand's 1992 call for a single European nuclear doctrine followed 
later in 1995 by the vague offers to devise a European dissuasion concertee involving the 
French deterrent. However, both attempts seem to have been made without prior 
consultations with Bonn or London.96 
E. FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
Historically, the French have been seen by some Americans as difficult allies 
because of their insistence on maintaining their rank as"in the words of Jean-Pierre 
Chevenement, "indisputably, the world's third military power."97 "Although the French 
would clearly prefer to pursue military cooperation in a West European framework, 
disappointments in this domain - a lack of partners and resources commensurate with 
French ambitions and assessments of security requirements - may lead them to give more 
attention to partnership with the United States."98 However, as Dominique MOlsi noted, 
"Paris and Washington are at once allies and competitors." 99 
96 David S. Yost, "Europe and Nuclear Deterrence," Survival 35, no. 3 (Autwnn 1993): 112. 
97 Chevenement quoted in 1988 while serving as Defense Minister. Yost, "France," 238. 
98 Yost, "France," 272. 
99 Dominique MOlsi, "The Trouble with France," ForeignA/fairs77, no. 3 (May/June 1998): 98. 
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Indeed, the collapse of the Berlin Wall precipitated a reawakening of French 
interest in ''the idea of a Europe Europeenne"lOO - a notion first propounded by de 
Gaulle which implied Europe's ability to play an autonomous role in international 
politics. At the end of the Cold War, France found itself in competition with the United 
States for a position of leadership in the new Europe. France's desire for the EU to create 
a Common Foreign and Security Policy "although formally welcomed by Washington, 
clashes with the United States' inclination to take the lead."lDl In Henry Kissinger's 
words, 
The adjustment of the internal relationships within the North Atlantic 
Alliance has been dominated by the perennial tug-of-war between the 
American and French views of Atlantic relationships. America has 
dominated NATO under the banner of integration. France, extolling 
European independence, has shaped the European Union. The result of 
their disagreement is that America's role is too dominant in the military 
field to promote a European political identity, while France's role is too 
insistent on European political autonomy to promote cohesion of 
NAT0.102 
"One of the greatest disappointments for proponents of an ESDI within NATO," 
according to Philip Gordon, "was the collapse of a French-American rapprochement that 
began in the early 1990s."103 Because of the AFSOUTH debate and the American 
refusal to back the accession of Romania and Slovenia in the first round of NATO 
100 Anand Menon, "Defense Policy and Integration in Western Europe," Contemporary Security Policy 17, 
DO. 2 (August 1996): 265-266. 
101 MOlsi, "The Trouble with France," 98. 
102 Henry KiSSinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994),822. 
103 Craig R. Whitney, "Paris Tells NATO It Stays Out For Now," International Herald Tribune, 2 October 
1997. 
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enlargement, France felt unable to continue forward on the path to closer ties with NATO 
and the United States. Further complicating the construction of an ESDI within NATO, 
France announced in June 1997 that it would not go further in re-joining NATO's 
integrated military structure in the foreseeable future due in part to the continuing 
AFSOUTH debate.104 
The French rapprochement with NATO was genuine and promising because "the 
agreement between these two long-time antagonists within NATO for a time seemed 
likely, after more that thirty years of debate, to permit the creation of an ESDI within 
NATO that would have satisfied both countries."105 Philip Gordon suggests that the 
"AFSOUTH dispute demonstrated the gap in thinking about ESDI that exists between 
France and the United States ... [and] demonstrated the lack of trust that prevails between 
Washington and Paris even after the period of rapprochement of the mid-1990s." 106 
The failure to reach an acceptable accord to resolve the AFSOUTH dispute along with 
French resentment of American unilateralism means that for now France's new 
relationship with NATO will remain incomplete. 107 
The task facing the United States is to maximize French involvement in an effort 
to ensure consent for the formation of transatlantic "coalitions of the willing" in the event 
104 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security (Washington 
DC: United States Institute of Peace, Forthcoming), 216. 
105 Philip Gordon, The United States and the European Security and Defense Identity in the New NATO, 
(Paris: Institut fran~ais des relations internationales, 1998),33. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Gordon, The United States and the European Security and Defense Identity in the New NATO, 36-37. 
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of serious threats to international peace and security. Formal military integration of 
French forces within NATO must matter less; actual contributions and mutually preferred 
outcomes must carry more emphasis.108 The US must do so without simultaneously 
sacrificing or downgrading crucial benefits to be gained from the formal integrated 
alliance structure. In any case, the rate of change in French diffidence will almost 
certainly continue to be slow and deliberate. 
F. FINAL REMARKS 
France's declining defense budget, the move towards professional armed forces, 
the scrapping of previously sacred joint projects with the Germans, and a rapprochement 
with NATO does not signal any abatement of France's traditional ambitions or "a return 
to status quo ante 1966."109 While France is drawing closer to NATO, Alliance members. 
should not be surprised to see France continue its policy of "NATO a la carte."110 
Nonetheless, it remains clear that French policies towards the US and NATO have 
changed. It is the depth of the changes that remains to be seen. 
In the post-Cold War era, do the reasons that led France to develop an 
"independent" nuclear arsenal still apply? As Philip Gordon notes, "the relevance of the 
108 Catherine McArdle Kelleher, The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment (Washington: 
The Brookings Institution, 1995), 18. 
109 William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, "France and NATO: The Image and the Reality," 
Parameters XXIV, no. 4 (Winter 1994-1995): 86. 
110 Ibid. 
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French nuclear force should be assessed in terms of the context in which it was bUilt."111 
The French deterrent, designed as a source of national pride and unity in a country that 
badly needed both, contributed to "winning" the Cold War as one more element of 
uncertainty for Kremlin strategists.112 Nuclear weapons have provided French leaders 
added strength with which to stake their claims to "great power" status and confidence in 
their ambitions to play an active role in the world. Recognizing the vital role nuclear 
weapons play as a symbol of French independence and national sovereignty, would 
France allow its "great power" status to be transferred to a supranational government 
based in Brussels? How does France maintain its status as an "independent" great power, 
while leading the march towards a common European defense within the European 
Union? As Luigi Barzini has noted: 
The strain is sometimes evident. The insistent crowing ... the demand that 
France be treated always as the foremost nation after the two superpowers, 
surely the first in Europe, the sometimes incoherent and contradictory 
foreign policy, complicate any relations with it as never before. Relations 
with it are further embroiled by the fact that it is admittedly true that it is 
still, in many ways, Numero Uno in continental Europe, whatever that may 
mean, and that Europe would be inconceivable without it. l13 
111 Gordon, "Charles de Gaulle and the Nuclear Revolution," 148. 
112 Johnsen and Young, 86. 
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IV. GERMANY: THE INIDBITED PARTNER 
The present-day world situation is such that one can only serve the 
interests of one's country by acting in concert with other countries .... a 
new age is dawning in which men will look beyond the borders of their 
own country and work in fraternal co-operation with other nations for the 
true aims of humanity .... This very task and the construction of a Europe 
dedicated to this goal afford a great mission for German youth.114 
Konrad Adenauer 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Germany is well on its way to fashioning itself as a viable "partner in leadership" 
for the United States. Despite the fears in some quarters of a new German hegemony, the 
unification of Germany promoted, rather than hindered, efforts towards greater European 
integration and community-building within the Euro-Atlantic security area. "By forging 
close links with France, as well as, other European countries, Germany was able to aid the 
process of Atlantic consensus building."115 The Federal Republic is leading the way 
towards a "wider and deeper" Europe partly because German leaders are finally adapting 
Germany's economic weight into political presence. 
At the end of World War IT, the Germans were forced to surrender their national 
sovereignty and endure occupation by the four most powerful victorious states. As a 
result, Germany has already made the conceptual leap towards a strategic culture that 
would accept a loss of some measure of sovereignty to a supranational political entity to 
114 Konrad Adenauer, "End of Nationalism," from World Indivisible, Liberty and Justice for All, translated 
by Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955). Available [Online]: 
[http://www.proeuropa.org], October 1998. 
115Lothar Gutjahr, "Global Stability and Euro-Atlantic Cooperation: The New Germany's Interest," in 
European Security 3, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 639. 
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gain a post-national European identity. GeImans have evolved beyond the perils 
associated with national chauvinism out of necessity and have sought "safety in numbers" 
by incorporating themselves within organizations in the name of rebuilding GeIman 
society and pursuing economic prosperity within Western institutions. In fact, the 
GeIman Basic Law provides a constitutional mechanism for legally giving up powers 
associated with national sovereignty. As stated in Article 24 of the GeIman constitution: 
(1) The Federation may, by legislation, transfer sovereign powers to 
international institutions. 
(2) For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may join a system of 
mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations 
upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a peaceful and 
lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world. 
(3) For the settlement of disputes between nations, the Federation will 
accede to agreements concerning a general, comprehensive and 
obligatory system of international arbitration.116 
Today's policymakers in Bonn/Berlin were inoculated (unlike their British and 
French colleagues) against national hubris as a result of having to bear the heavy burden 
of (and moral as well as political responsibility for) responsibilities for the atrocities 
committed by Adolf Hitler and the Nazis during World War ll. As Elizabeth Pond has 
noted, "[t]he much more nationalistic French and English, having been spared such 
shame, still face the painful loss of narrow patriotism as the European Community (EC) 
assumes more authority."117 
116 Italics added for emphasis. From the BASIC LAW for the Federal Republic of Germany, Promulgated 
by the Parliamentary Council on 23 May 1949, Amended by the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990, and 
Federal Statute of23 September 1990. Available [Online]: [http://www.jura.uni-sb.dellaw/GG/gg2.htm). 
July 1998. 
117 Elizabeth Pond, "Germany in the New Europe," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 115. 
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Germany's attitude towards West European security and defense affairs has 
evolved over the years since unification. For example, in 1990, when the Persian Gulf 
war broke out, Germany was still marked by its Cold War reticence. Hesitant about the 
use of German military force abroad, Germany's leaders failed to demonstrate any 
interest in adopting a more prominent role in international security. However, since the 
Gulf War, the emphasis of Germany's external security policies has gradually shifted 
towards action as illustrated by the new willingness of German political leaders to adopt 
additional responsibilities more commensurate with the nation's "weight class." 
B. GERMANY'S PLACE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN IDEA 
After World War II, the West Germans were not allowed to establish armed forces 
until the Federal Republic of Germany had been admitted to the Brussels Treaty and 
NATO. Furthermore, these events were preceded by the Federal Republic's renunciation 
of options to build nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in 1954. Thus far, the 
Federal Republic has shown no interest in a national nuclear deterrent and the 1954 
commitments have been supplemented by those in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and the ''Two-pIus-Four'' Treaty on German unification. As a result of these 
commitments and other constraints, Germany has not conducted an energetic foreign 
policy proportionate to its economic might and at times has suffered the political 
consequences for this inability. This is why the country has been known for years as "an 
economic giant but a political dWarf."118 
118 Luigi Barzini, The Europeans (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), IOI. 
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In order to maintain the current European peace and bolster Europe's place in 
world affairs, it remains a German belief that the European nations should act as one as 
soon as possible. Collectively, Europe must patiently weave a net of counterbalancing 
ententes to preserve the balance of power. It is in this manner, Germans believe, that 
Europe would be most likely to speak with a collective voice in a strong and authoritative 
enough manner to make Washington listen carefully to the European point of view. 
However, care should be taken not to exaggerate the extent to which Germany has 
changed since the end of the Cold War. Significant constraints on the role Germany plays 
on the international scene still exist. First, the memory of World War IT has not 
disappeared - within Germany or its neighbors. Second, despite being buoyed by 
legitimacy as a result of the July 1994 rulings by the Federal Constitutional Court for the 
most recent troop deployments abroad, legal restrictions remain on the use of German , 
military forces. For example, the Bundestag abroad must approve the use of German 
military forces before actual deployment abroad. Third, public opinion within Germany, 
which is still in the midst of East-West consolidation, is showing little change towards 
German participation in military operations beyond the Alliance area.119 
On the whole, Germans remain reticent about undertaking military operations 
abroad. Although a majority of Germans support the principle of military intervention 
under UN auspices, only 32 percent of those polled supported Bundeswehr participation 
119 David S. Yost, NATO Transjonned: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security (Washington 
DC: United States InstituteofPeace, Forthcoming), 214. 
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in NATO operations outside Germany. Moreover, only 20 percent supported German 
military participation in UN-sponsored operations such as Desert Storm. 120 
From the German perspective, a new Europe must be assembled with three 
primary elements in mind. First, the self-containment of German military power remains 
paramount in order that Germany may use its economic power to influence its European 
neighbors in pursuit of German policy objectives; The second element is the creation of 
an independent Europe capable of negotiating on an equal basis with the United States at 
least on economic issues. Finally, the third element is the continued "demilitarization" of 
Europe, which depends upon the sustained growth of democracy and free markets in the 
former states of the Warsaw Pact. 121 However, for the European project to truly succeed, 
Germany must make a full recovery from its self-perpetuating fears of nationalism and 
embrace a level of responsibility in European security and defense affairs more 
commensurate with its standing in Europe. 
C. POLICIES TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN 
SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY 
German leaders face a dilemma within the implementation of their security 
policies. On the one hand, Germany seeks to retain the American extended deterrent, 
while on the other, it hopes to build a prosperous, politically stable and "independent" 
Europe within an inclusive pan-European security system. How will Germany manage its 
120 Philip H. Gordon, France, Germany and the Western Alliance (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995), 
91-92. 
121 James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, Recasting the European Order: Security Architectures and 
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relations within and outside of Europe given that its national agenda contains aims that 
may not be simultaneously achievable? There is no "quick and painless" solution to this 
German security dilemma. The problem is too complex to be solved by simply choosing 
among the myriad of organizations available in Europe: NATO, the OSCE, the EU, and 
the WEU. In fact, German leaders often reject any notion that a choice must actually be 
made.122 
Germany's continuous political balancing act is an effort to maintain the political 
equilibrium between Germany's relationship with NATO and its desire to pursue closer 
integration in security and defense matters with France. Each time Germany has 
supported NATO's agenda (for instance, integration into the Rapid Reaction Corps or co-
sponsoring the North Atlantic Cooperation Council), Germany has also taken the 
necessary commensurate steps in the other direction in an effort to satisfy France (for 
instance, supporting the creation of the EUROCORPS and French proposals for ESDI). 
Thus far, the German strategic balancing act between the French and American positions 
has proven highly successful. Undoubtedly, German governments will seek to continue 
the balancing act between the American and French points of view for as long as 
possible. According to the former Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, ''We cannot accept an 
'either-or' situation."123 Consequently, the evolution of the WEU and the creation of the 
ESDI will most likely be pursued within the following constraints: Germany's 
122 Sperling and Kirchner, 256. 
123 Klaus Kinkel quoted from "Bonn und Paris wollen den Weg in die Zukunft weisen," Frankfurter 
Ammgemeine Zeitung, 22 January 1993. Cited in Philip H. Gordon, France, Germany and the Western 
Alliance (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995),90. 
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transatlantic relationship with the US must remain intact; and the expansion of the EU 
and the WEU will lead to incongruent memberships. 124 
As Holger Mey has noted, "Germany will always have certain reservations with 
regard to the creation of a 'purely' European defense"125 because it is hard to imagine a 
European non-Article 5 contingency in which the United States has nothing at stake. 
Furthermore, Mey states, "Even if there are some scenarios in which Europeans would 
want to and could, go it alone, there are many scenarios in which at least the Germans 
would want the United States to be involved from the beginning. After all, what has 
begun as a non-Article 5 contingency may quickly and easily become Article 5 
contingency." 126 
Since the full development of the EU to become a s~pranational political union 
will probably not occur anytime in the foreseeable future, Germany must continue to play 
an active national role in security and defense matters, while the integration process 
continues. In the long run, many Germans view the WEU as the structural basis for a 
future ESDI. However, the WEU remains unable to support the types of military 
operations (including power projection) that NATO is still able to provide. Therefore, the 
priorities of Germany's leaders remain in favor of a "long-term Europeanisation 
124 Holger H. Mey, ''View for Germany: A European Security and Defense Identity - What Role for the 
United States?" Comparative Strategy 14, no. 3 (July-September 1995): 315. 
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while keeping operational structures of transatlantic cooperation for the foreseeable 
future."127 
D. GERMANY'S NUCLEAR POLICIES 
From the very beginnings of the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany was 
strategically exposed. As the most important state on the front lines, West Germany was 
the most dependent on external protection and relied heavily on US nuclear guarantees of 
extended deterrence to counter the conventional and nuclear threats posed by the Warsaw 
Pact nations. However, the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and 
German reunification have not altered Germany's reliance on the nuclear qualities of the 
transatlantic relationship. 
There are significant differences in approach and emphasis between Britain and 
France, the nuclear weapons states of Europe, and Germany, a non-nuclear weapons state 
but a burgeoning economic powerhouse. As nuclear weapons states, Britain and France 
each rely on their "independent" deterrents not only as an expression of national 
sovereignty but also to confer a degree of immunity. on their national territories. 
Conversely, Germany has relied on others - namely the United States - for extended 
deterrence because Germany was the country most likely to suffer nuclear destruction if 
deterrence failed during the Cold War. "Committed to a non-nuclear status, Germans feel 
more comfortable with an American nuclear guarantee and are still not ready to accept 
127 Gutjahr, 639. 
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such a guarantee from France - which is not being offered anyway."128 Consequently, 
the core of Germany's foreign and security policy is the maintenance of close 
relationships with its neighbors within European security structures. 
National nuclear deterrent capabilities or a nuclear security arrangement are 
especially important to a non-nuclear country like Germany that will not "have sufficient 
political weight and influence in any alliance with nuclear partners."129 Would a 
perception of US disengagement from Europe push Germany into assuming a more 
visible role in European security through the acquisition of a German nuclear deterrent? 
Among Germans, the repudiation of a German nuclear weapons capability cannot be 
underestimated. In fact, German scholars in strategic studies hold that no group in the 
German political spectrum would suggest that Germany acquire nuclear weapons, which 
would be seen as a violation of constitutional positions and international treaties.130 
Karl-Heinz Kamp has noted that "in light of today's anti-nuclear tendencies in Germany, 
combined with [a] cautious attitude to military power in general, the possibility of a 
majority of Germans striving for nuclear weapons comes close to niL"131 
Future German security- policy will probably continue to be shaped in part by 
nuclear weapons as an element of the international political-military environment. 
128 Gordon, France, Germany and the Western Alliance, 90. 
129 Thomas Enders, Holger H. Mey, and Michael RUhle, ''The New Germany and Nuclear Weapons," In 
PatrickJ. Garrity and Steven Maaranen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World (New York: 
Plenum Press) 1992, 142-143. 
130 Ibid., 138. 
131 Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Germany and the Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe," Security Dialogue 26, 
no. 3 (September 1995): 288. 
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According to the 1994 German Defense White Paper: 
The role and importance of NATO's nuclear arsenal have 
changed ... [however] the presence of North American troops in Europe 
and an appropriate combination of conventional and nuclear forces at a 
much reduced level remain essential cornerstones of a collective and 
integrated defence based increasingly on multinational force structures.132 
The preceding statement implies a modified role for US nuclear weapons. However, the 
1994 German Defense White Paper fails to specify any design in European defense affairs 
for a nuclear dimension in European construction. 
Shortly before joining the Clinton Administration, Walter Slocombe, now the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, wrote: 
A unified Germany would not readily rely indefinitely on a British or 
French deterrent. The practical issue,therefore, is whether there will be 
US nuclear weapons in Europe - or German ones. So long as there is a 
reluctance to see German nuclear weapons, there will be a strong case for 
an American nuclear guarantee made manifest by the presence of nuclear 
weapons nearby. 133 
Maintaining a continuing American military presence in Germany, with conventional and 
nuclear forces, for as long as the Germans desire, remains an extremely valuable 
expression of the US security commitment to allies in Europe. US Nuclear weapons 
should remain in Germany as long as they are wanted and needed, because they serve also 
as symbols of political reassurance. Catherine McArdle Kelleher has noted that 
132 German Federal Government, White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr (Cologne: Federal Ministry of Defence, 1994),50. 
133 Walter Slocombe cited in David S. Yost, "The Future of US Overseas Presence," Joint Force 
Quarterly (Summer 1995): 80. 
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"American leadership with Germany in NATO on more equitable terms and in more 
cooperating or coordinating nodes will be essential."134 
Germany's overriding principle is not to hold up the already demanding European 
integration agenda with a subject that is too complex to be solved in a prompt manner. 135 
German leaders have demonstrated that they attach no urgency to efforts to resolve 
critical issues with respect to the creation of a nuclear dimension of European 
construction. This low profile approach by the German government to the issue of a 
European nuclear deterrent may be explained to some degree by the magnitude of the 
economic and social problems related to German unification that remain more central 
preoccupations for German leaders. In any case, the extension of protection via the 
British and French national deterrents and the creation of a unified "sanctuary" that 
encompassed all the ED members would require deep and comprehensive integration and 
strategic planning, while also overcoming the present concepts of the nation-state. 
E. GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
While serving as Defense Minister, Volker Ruhe stated the following aims for the 
April 1999 NATO Summit as part of NATO's new strategic consensus: balancing 
between preservation and innovation of the new NATO; ensuring the European and 
Atlantic dimensions of the Atlantic Alliance as a "partnership of equals;" and maintaining 
134 Catherine McArdle Kelleher, The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment (Washington: 
The Brookings Institution, 1995), 143. 
135 Kamp, "Germany and the Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe," 287. 
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positive relations with Russia and Ukraine as NATO goes forward towards a new 
strategic consensus.136 Today, Germany needs NATO and the United States for many of 
the same reasons as during the Cold War, even though circumstances have changed in 
some fundamental ways. "German leaders are well aware that the presence of American 
troops in Germany not only serves to deter any aggression and prevent the 
'nationalization' of European defense, but it also serves to reassure Germany's neighbors, 
who would be uncomfortable without the Americans around."137 
For the United States, one of the toughest adjustments during the post-Cold War 
era has been, and will continue to be, forming a new relationship with the Federal 
Republic of Germany - the key country in any future European enterprises. The postwar 
German-American relationship has gone through several phases: Germany as pupil; 
Germany as key NATO ally; and Germany as America's strategic pa.rtn,er at the end of the 
Cold War. However, unification signalled the end of the informal, as well as formal 
political constraints and an ultimate reduction of security dependencies, leaving 
136 Volker RUbe, ''Europe's Security in the Next Millenium," speech given at Stanford University on 21 
May 1998. 
137 Philip H. Gordon, France, Germany and the WestemAlliance (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995), 
90. 
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Germany less affected in the long run by American choices and preferences.138 In the 
words of the former Minister of Defense Volker Ruhe, 
the history of the 20th century has taught us that the fates of Europe and 
America are intertwined. To each of us, events in Europe are just as 
important today as they were 10 or 20 years ago. Europe may no longer 
play the central role it used to in U.S. defense planning as an endangered 
continent, but it has become more important as an ally and a partner. I 
cannot think of a single major strategic issue where U.S. and European 
interests are opposed. And there is hardly a problem either of us faces that 
we would not be much better off facing together.139 
Germany remains a critical concern to many, in part because of its actual or 
potential predominance politically, economically, and militarily in Europe. The United 
States is still seen by many Europeans as the counterweight to a strong Germany and the 
guarantor of a continuing European balance. 140 As the editor of Die Zeit and a former 
director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Christoph Bertram has stated 
that "For Germany, the Alliance has had, and continues to have, a special function, 
namely that of making German power controllable and more acceptable to Allies and 
138 Kelleher, The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment, 143. 
139 Minister of Defense Volker Riihe, Remarks at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International 
Studies/American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington D.C, April 30, 1996. Available 
[Online]: [http://www.germany-info.org/govern!st0796.htm], July 98. 
140 Kelleher, The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment, 14. 
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political adversaries alike."141 However, Europe's delicate political balance is changing 
and, as noted by Henry Kissinger, 
In the years ahead, all the traditional Atlantic relationships will change. 
Europe will not feel the previous need for American protection and will 
pursue its economic self-interest much more aggressively; America will 
not be willing to sacrifice as much for European security and will be 
tempted by isolationism in various guises; in due course, Germany will 
insist on the political influence to which its military and economic power 
entitle it and will not be so emotionally dependent on American military 
and French political support.142 
F. FINAL REMARKS 
Within the new European community, the Germans are being forced by 
circumstance to abandon their dream of remaining an apolitical Switzerland writ large. 
Germany will increasingly be called upon to exercise leadership within NATO, the EU, 
the WEU, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Euro-Atlantic community. For 
Americans, recognizing the. prospect of a "normalized" Germany playing a positive 
political role in European affairs is a step towards becoming true "partners in 
leadership."143 However, for other Europeans, the rise of a unified Germany - revived 
and restored - is not always such a comforting sight. 
Nevertheless, "[t]he more Germany's partners accept Germany as a 'normal state' 
- with all due regard for its past and potential- and the more they [the other Europeans] 
141 Yost, NATO Transformed, 54. 
142 Henry KiSSinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994),821. 
143 Pond, "Germany in the New Europe," 130. 
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join the Germans in their emphasis on multilateralism, the better the chances will be that 
Germany will stay on a steady course."l44 However, it remains a "tall order" to ask 
fellow Europeans to forget all that has transpired in the past, particularly Germany's role 
in the tragic history of Europe in fIrst half of this century. In spite of Germany's efforts to 
assuage the fears of its neighbors in the European community, Europeans remain wary of 
a unified Germany. Coupled with the recent electoral loss of Helmut Kohl to Gerhard 
Schroeder on 27 September 1998, Europeans along with the rest of the international 
community will keep a watchful eye out for Germany's political trajectory into the 
twenty-first century. As Luigi Barzini has noted: 
It is therefore once again essential for everybody, the French, the British, 
the Italians, the other Europeans, as well as the Americans and the Soviets, 
to keep an eye across the Rhine and the Alps and the Elbe in order to 
figure out, as our fathers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers, the ancient 
Romans, and remote ancestors had to do, who the Germans are, who they 
think they are, what are they doing, and where will they go next, wittingly 
or unwittingly. 145 
144 Harald Mueller, "German Foreign Policy after Unification," in Paul Stares, ed., The New Germany and 
the New Europe (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992), 164. 
145 Barzini, 69. 
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v. PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENT COOPERATION AMONG 
THE MAJOR WESTERN EUROPEAN POWERS 
In the nuclear age, the ultimate guarantee of survival and independence is 
a credible deterrent. Western Europe could only dispense with the United 
States if it fielded a deterrent capability commensurate with the Soviet 
force reserved for Western Europe. Yet, how could Western Europe 
achieve this goal without true supranational integration?146 
Josef Joffe 
A. BACKGROUND 
In Western European security affairs, American nuclear commitments have been 
the supreme guarantor of security on the continent since 1949.147 In view of this nuclear 
legacy, American nuclear weapon systems and more importantly American nuclear 
commitments will continue to playa vital role within the evolving security architecture in 
Europe in the foreseeable future. Any lessening or withdrawal of US nuclear 
commitments would certainly have great ramifications for the present and future security 
landscape of Europe as well as the vitality of the transatlantic relationship. Indeed, the 
ongoing process towards the creation of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy will 
sooner or later lead to questions of how to integrate British and French nuclear forces and 
how to make a non-nuclear Germany a partner within any future European security 
architecture. 
In the period spanning the establishment of NATO to the demise of the Soviet 
Union, various attempts were made to establish alternate forms of nuclear trusteeship or 
146 Josef Joffe, ''Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign Policy, no. 54 (Spring 1984): 77. 
147 NATO Strategic Concept of December 1949. Approved by the North Atlantic Council on 06 January 
1950. Available [Online]: [http://www.nato.intldocu]comm!c5000106a.htm].November 1998. 
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cooperation by establishing greater West European defense cooperation. In 1957-1958, 
the French-Italian-GeIman (FIG) negotiations, which included public agreements 
concerning conventional arms, were rumored to have broached a joint nuclear weapons 
production venture whereby French nuclear weapons programs would receive some 
fmancing from Italy and West GeImany.148 By the time of General de Gaulle's election 
to the Presidency in 1958, the FIG negotiations had lost political momentum due to 
GeIman reservations with respect to French intentions and the general uncertainty over 
the American position on the subject of sharing control over nuclear weapons. On the 
French side, de Gaulle immediately rejected West GeIman collaboration in the French 
nuclear program on the grounds that development of the force de frappe should remain 
strictly a national endeavor. Nevertheless, as David Yost has noted, "even in the rather 
murky case of the French-Italian-GeIman negotiations ... France's partners seem to have 
stressed that a stronger and more cohesive West European defense effort would still 
require alliance with the US."149 
Despite the failure of the FIG negotiations, France and GeImany remained 
involved in cooperative nuclear weapons planning because of their inherent 
responsibilities to provide some delivery means for US nuclear weapons based in West 
GeImany. This cooperative arrangement existed until the French withdrew from NATO's 
integrated military structure effective on 1 July 1966. Although General de 
148 David S. Yost, Alternative Structures of European Security, Working Paper no. 81(Washington, DC: 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1987), 34. 
149 Ibid., 35. 
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Gaulle envisaged a long-term role for the French strategic force at the European level, no 
concrete proposals were ever forwarded.1 S0 In any case, de Gaulle's next attempts to 
promote West European defense cooperation were the "failed" Fouchet Plan negotiations 
within the European Economic Community in 1960-1962 and the Franco-German 
(Elysee) Treaty of January 1963 with West Germany. The demise of the Fouchet Plan, a 
proposed West European political union with implied nuclear means, led to the successful 
efforts towards Franco-German rapprochement and the establishment of formal 
consultation mechanisms as a result of the Elysee Treaty. 
In the early 1960s, the concept of a Multilateral Force (MLF) proposed by the 
Kennedy Administration broached the idea of bringing together an internationally 
manned fleet of nuclear-armed surface ships and submarines under the control of the 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). However, in 1965, the British 
unveiled the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) as a counter to the MLF and proposed that 
internationally manned US and UK Polaris missile submarines operate within the NATO 
framework. The British proposal effectively denied any political momentum towards the 
MLF concept. Alastair Buchan, the MLF's most ardent and effective critic, argued that 
control - not manning - should be the primary issue in forming nuclear deterrent policies 
and his detailed analysis published in 1964 exposed the frailty of the "nuclear-sharing" 
concept, which led to the MLF's eventual demise. 151 In place of the MLF and ANF, a 
150 Pascal Boniface, ''French Nuclear Strategy and European Deterrence: 'les Rendez-vous Marques' ," 
Contemporary Security Policy 17, no. 2 (August 1996): 227. 
151 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution o/Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).328. 
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consultation forum known as NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was adopted with 
the goal of encouraging consultation on nuclear deterrent policies in the Alliance. The 
NPG still exists and remains effective today. 
In the late 1960s, greater nuclear cooperation between Britain and France was 
considered, drawing its political impetus from the vague comments attributed to French 
President Georges Pompidou and Edward Heath, the British Conservative party leader. 
After Heath became Prime Minister in 1970, however, no further progress towards 
establishing deeper nuclear protocols between the two European nuclear powers is known 
to have taken place. As David Yost noted, "[i]f any negotiations on the possibility ever 
took place, they were probably frustrated by the clash between (a) the British principle of 
coordinating nuclear weapons planning with the US and NATO and (b) the French 
determination not to permit any such arrangements to interfere with France's complete 
liberty of decision regarding nuclear weapons employment."152 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, there were several more attempts to gain some 
measure of cooperation in nuclear affairs among the West Europeans. In the early 1970s, 
the French sought closer nuclear ties with the British by offering to share development 
costs of the new French SLBM - MSBS M4 - portraying it as a European alternative to 
the US-built Poseidon SLBM.153 Instead, the British opted for their own indigenous 
payload package, the Chevaline, for their Polaris missiles, purchased from the United 
152 Yost, Alternative Structures Of European Security, 35. 
153 Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook: 
British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Vol V (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994),197. 
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States. In 1974 and 1975, the French plan to deploy Pluton missiles to West Germany 
met with failure because of the French objection to any type of German "double key" 
arrangement (veto power over the employment of the French nuclear forces).154 In 
October 1987, President Mitterrand reaffirmed France's obligation to consult with 
Germany prior to the employment of French sub-strategic nuclear weapons on German 
soil.I55 Furthermore, David Yost has noted that there have been various other ideas 
floated for a Western European nuclear planning group for consultations concerning the 
British and French deterrents that never reached the discussion table of governments. 156 
Since the end of the Cold War, French officials have made two more proposals to 
consolidate British and French nuclear forces to form a nuclear dimension of European 
construction. In January 1992, President Mitterrand proposed studying a basis for a 
"European" nuclear doctrine through the following statement: 
Only two of the twelve have an atomic force. For their national policy, 
they have a clear doctrine. Is it possible to conceive a European doctrine? 
This question will very rapidly become one of the major questions in the 
construction of a joint European defense. 157 
Three years later, in January and February 1995, Alain Juppe (then Foreign Minister) first 
proposed the dissuasion concertee concept. In August/September 1995, French Prime 
154 David S. Yost, "Franco-German Defence Cooperation," in Stephen F. Szabo, ed., The Bundeswehr and 
Western Security (London: MacMillan, 1990),235. 
155 Edward Kolodziej, "British-French Nuclearization and European Denuclearization: Implications for US 
Policy," In Philippe G. Le Prestre, ed., French Security Policy in a Disarming World: Domestic Challenges 
and International Constraints (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 136. 
156 David S. Yost, Western Europe and Nuclear Weapons, (Livermore, California: Center for Security and 
Technology Studies, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, University of California, 1993). 
157 Fran90is Mitterrand, speech given at the Palais des Congres, Paris, 10 January 1992. 
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Minister Alain Juppe proposed the dissuasion concertee proposal in the midst of the 
diplomatic outcry attributed to President Chirac's announcement that France would 
conduct a limited series of nuclear tests. 
Both Mitterrand's 1992 ''Buro-doctrine'' proposal and Juppe's 1995 dissuasion 
concertee initiative suggested that France was disposed to seek a previously unthinkable 
degree of Franco-British nuclear cooperation by offering to "Europeanize" the French 
nuclear deterrent. While certainly not proposing "extended" deterrence, French officials 
believed that the dissuasion concertee initiative was not a suggestion for "shared" 
deterrence either. France has, since the very beginnings of its independent nuclear force, 
rejected any notion of "extended" deterrence. Likewise, "shared" deterrence is also not 
considered a viable option due to the lack of institutional control within an established 
supranational political union. When forced to interpret the meaning behind the 
dissuasion concertee initiative, Prime Minister Juppe preferred to emphasize a 
"relationship among equals" built upon the foundation laid earlier by the Franco-British 
Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine and also including Germany)58 
Rather than the literal translation of 'concerted deterrence', David S. Yost suggests, an 
alternate translation of the French nuclear mindset concerning the dissuasion concertee 
initiative would be "deterrence supported by continuing consultation and substantive 
consensus."159 
158 Alain Juppe, speech given at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense N ationale, 7 September 1995. 
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The rest of this chapter is devoted to analyzing the prospects for nuclear deterrent 
cooperation among Britain, France, and Germany. In May 1994, a WEU defense 
committee report titled "The Role and Future of Nuclear Weapons" stated: 
... given the Maastricht Treaty's declared intention of developing a 
common European foreign and security policy and European defence 
identity, the role of France's and the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons 
in this framework cannot be ignored. Sooner or later this issue will have 
to be considered. 160 
Despite the recent dialogue in nuclear matters among the major West European powers, 
there still exist substantial obstacles that must be overcome prior to achieving nuclear 
cooperation on a scale required to ensure a truly autonomous Europe. In terms of the 
WEU defense committee report, the "Eurodeterrent" question was deemed important 
because: 
Europe must of necessity reach a decision in this matter. It would be 
unimaginable for the European Union to define a common' foreign and 
security policy and at the same time for France and Britain to continue to 
insist on defining their vital interests as they perceive them, in isolation, 
protected by their strike forces ... The debate on the European nuclear 
deterrent will be the moment of truth in the construction of a European 
political union.161 
It is within this context that the Anglo-French relationship, the realities of the Franco-
German couple, and the role of the Anglo-German partnership must be examined in an 
attempt to ascertain their effect on the creation of a nuclear dimension in European 
construction. 
160 WEU defence committee, "The Role and Future of Nuclear Weapons," (Document 1420), 19 May 
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B. ANGLO-FRENCH COOPERATION 
The response from London to the call from Paris for a single nuclear doctrine 
applied for a joint West European deterrent appeared skeptical to say the least. fu 
response to 'Mitterrand's 1992 proposal, then British Secretary of State for Defence 
Minister Malcolm Rifkind responded: 
For Europe and America to develop separate security strategies would be 
in the interests of neither continent .. , It is not in our interests to encourage 
any tendency towards thinking that there could be a major conflict in 
Europe in which the question of nuclear use arose which did not involve 
the vital interests of all allies including the United States. 162 
Hence, Rifkind's statement is a clear endorsement of NATO nuclear strategy and also 
indicates that the role of the "independent" British deterrent remains as a second-center of 
decision making that complicates the decision matrix of any would-be aggressor. 
Although talks between London and Paris have explored the possibilities of a single 
European nuclear doctrine on a continual basis, they have failed to sustain any motive 
force beyond continued dialogue and cooperation on only the most basic and fundamental 
nuclear issues. 163 
The forum for the continuing nuclear dialogue is the Anglo-French Joint 
Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine, which was established in November 1992. 
The Anglo-French Joint Commission has facilitated increased dialogue and cooperation-
however limited - in nuclear matters between Britain and France. The increased Anglo-
162 Malcolm Rifkind, ''Extending Deterrence?," speech given at a colloquium on strategic issues, Paris, 
France, 30 September 1992. 
163 Nicholas K. J. Witney, "British Nuclear Policy after the Cold War," Survival 36, no. 4 (Winter 1995-
1996): 96-112. 
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French nuclear cooperation seems to be based in part on the fact that as medium sized, or 
second-tier, nuclear powers, Britain and France are isolated in internati~nal arms control 
negotiations; both face pressures from non-nuclear weapon European states and US-
Russian bilateral initiatives.164 Despite the lack of official documents and public 
statements from which to accurately measure the depth of the Franco-British nuclear 
relationship, both nations discovered that they possess more similar concerns vis-a.-vis 
nuclear matters than was anticipated initially. In October 1995, Prime Minister Major 
and President Chirac issued a joint statement on nuclear cooperation declaring that aim of 
the Anglo-French dialogue in this area is "to mutually strengthen deterrence, while 
retaining the independence of our nuclear forces. The deepening of co-operation ... will 
therefore strengthen the European contribution to overall deterrence."165 
In December 1995, President Chirac again floated the "Eurodeterrent" trial 
balloon by repeating the offer to "Europeanize" the role of the French deterrent. 
However, the proposal suffered from poor timing and was perceived by the British and 
most other Europeans as a cynical attempt to wrap the French decision to resume nuclear 
testing in the protective garb of European unity.166 In spite of French overtures 
concerning the creation of a European nuclear dimension, British policy with regard to 
164 Camille Grand, A French Nuclear Exception?, Occasional Paper no. 38 (Washington, DC: The Henry 
L. Stimson Center, January 1998), 20. 
165 Jacques Chirac and John Major, Joint Statement on nuclear cooperation given at UK-France Summit, 
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the creation of a European nuclear dimension remains staunchly of the Atlanticist 
perspective. . 
London remains opposed to any form of nuclear deterrent cooperation that could 
separate the British deterrent from the structure of the Atlantic Alliance. Furthermore, 
British leaders remain quick to note that a "Eurodeterrent" is unnecessary based squarely 
on the fact that Britain's nuclear deterrent, unlike France's, has been committed since 
1962 to a deterrence role for Britain's non-nuclear European partners within the NATO 
nuclear consultations system. Britain's NATO-centric attitude was evident in Rifkind's 
1992 Paris speech: 
Weare as committed as is France to the total operational independence of 
our deterrent ... But we have regarded the commitment of forces as an 
important way of underlining the message that our deterrent is there for 
our non-nuclear Allies as well - that Britain would regard her own vital 
interest as at stake in any attack upon an Alliance member. The Alliance 
strategy provides for flexibility in the choice of response dependent on the 
circumstance. 167 
Despite limited gains towards greater nuclear cooperation, Britain's perspective remains 
that the Anglo-French Joint Commission plays only a minor political role and that future 
dialogue in this area should be confined to only the most basic bilateral consultations on 
nuclear policy. The foundation of the British attitude is the belief that NATO's Nuclear 
Planning Group already provides a multilateral forum for consultation in nuclear 
deterrence matters involving Western Europe. Hence, if the French were truly serious 
abou~ "Europeanizing" the role of the French deterrent, they should do so by upholding 
167 Malcolm Rifkind, speech in Paris, 30 September 1992. 
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the nuclear strategy of the Atlantic Alliance and becoming a member of NATO's Nuclear 
Planning Group. 
On the other hand, leaders in Paris insist that French NPG membership would 
lead to an unacceptable level of subordination of French nuclear forces to the leaders in 
Washington. For France, non-participation in the NPG asserts French national 
sovereignty and reinforces a sense of autonomy in strategic planning. This approach 
plays to the French ideals of national independence and remains a major obstacle in 
nuclear cooperation because it restricts dialogue among the allies and hampers the 
development of a unified nuclear planning process. In fact, French participation in the 
NPG would not only strengthen the European pillar but also enhance the security of 
NATO Europe by making France's nuclear commitment to collective defense less 
ambiguous. In fact, any flexibility demonstrated by France could lead to "previously 
unthinkable links to the NPG and perhaps other adjustments in France's relationship with 
NATO."168 However, a French reversal in the near term regarding active involvement in 
the NATO NPG remains unlikely.I69 As Henry Kissinger has noted, "[tJhe difference 
between the British and French attitudes towards their nuclear weapons was that Great 
Bri:tain was prepared to sacrifice form to substance, whereas De Gaulle, in striving to 
reassert France's identity, equated form with substance."170 
168 David S. Yost, "France's Nuclear Dilemmas," Foreign Affairs 75. no. 1 (1996): 108-118. 
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At the operational level, it has been suggested that Britain and France could 
achieve greater nuclear deterrent cooperation by coordinating nuclear missile submarine 
patrols and/or undertaking some form of joint targeting. 171 However, the current nuclear 
doctrines of both countries demand that at least one submarine always remain deployed, 
so that a minimum national nuclear retaliatory capability is maintained. As long as there 
remains no room for maneuver within these areas, there is nothing including targeting, for 
a "European" version of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (or an evolved and mature 
WEU for that matter) to coordinate. Only if each country agreed that its "vital interests" 
could be adequately guaranteed by the presence at sea of the other's nuclear submarine 
force could the question of increased coordination become relevant. However, this would 
be a drastic departure from traditional strategic policy making in both countries. In fact, 
the cost savings would most likely be inconsequential when compared to the domestic 
political ramifications in London and Paris as a result of such a tum in nuclear security 
policy. 172 
The recent attitudes towards cooperation in nuclear matters between London and 
Paris will remain pivotal in determining the future nuclear policies of both countries. 
However, the 1994 French Defense White Paper appeared to already acknowledge the 
171 European and US officials suggested shortly after the INF treaty was signed in 1987 that British and 
French submarine patrols could cover Soviet targets once reserved for US medium range missiles in 
Europe. George Leopoid and Michael J. Witt, "Plan for Joint UK-France sub patrols draws skepticism," 
Defense News, 29 July 1991,14. 
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obstacles impeding further progress towards greater West European nuclear cooperation, 
as well as the inevitable outcomes of the "Eurodeterrent" proposals: 
The problem of a European nuclear doctrine is destined to become one of 
the major questions in building up a common European defence. The 
subject will become more acute with the European Union gradually 
realizing its political identity as well as its security and defence identity. 
This is as yet a remote prospect, but we should not lose sight of it. With 
nuclear potential, Europe's autonomy with regard to defence is possible. 
Without it, it is not ... there will be no European nuclear doctrine, no 
European deterrence, until there are vital European interests, considered as 
such by the Europeans and understood as such by others.173 
Thus, from the French perspective, a European nuclear doctrine and deterrent 
remain an essential ''[mal'' ingredient for the development of an autonomous Common 
Foreign and Security Policy for the EU. The planned downsizing of the British deterrent 
as stated in the 1998 Strategic Defense Review will provide France an almost 2 to 1 
advantage in terms of nuclear warheads. If this numerical superiority led to French 
interests being accorded more political weight in the EU, and this in tum translated into 
French dominance in EU defense and political decision-making, the British would be 
hard pressed to continue their plans to go to a "minimal" deterrent and risk playing a 
subordinate role to France in the European security arena. 174 
173 French Government, Livre Blanc sur la Defense 1994 (Paris: La Documentation Francaise, 1994), 50. 
174 Rebecca Johnson, British Perspectives on the Future of Nuclear Weapons, Occasional Paper no. 37 
(Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1998),29. 
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C. FRANCO·GERMAN COUPLE 
The relationship between France and Germany has never been obvious and easily 
understood because diverging interests rather than a pursuit of a common point of view 
have defined the character of the Franco-German couple.175 As Peter Schmidt has noted. 
"France and Germany tend to agree much more on institution building than on hard-core 
policies."176 Luigi Barzini accounted for the Paris-BonnlBerlin axis in the following 
manner: 
Three wars since 1870. all of them fought against Germany. cracked its 
comforting faith in its invincibility. and this is why France must now keep 
abreast of Germany. keep them under surveillance. maintain the most 
intimate relations with them. and hold them in an embrace as close as a 
stranglehold. If France cannot dominate Europe alone. it hopes that maybe 
two nations together might do so.l77 
Furthermore. as Dominique Molsi notes. the pairing of the Franco-German couple is 
inevitable mainly because both nations are "deeply aware that they must preserve it [the 
relationship]. regardless of frustration. disillusion or even suspicion ... [because] no 
serious alternatives exist in Europe to their unique relationship."178 
Since German unification. Presidents Mitterrand and Chirac have entertained the 
idea of establishing closer ties with Britain as a means to counter-balance the political and 
175 Guillaume Parmentier, "Painstaking Adaptation to the New Europe: French and German Defence 
Policies in 1997," Paper presented at the Conference for France and Japan in a changing security 
environment. Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, 23-24 June 1997. 
176 Peter Schmidt, "ESDI: A German Analysis," in Charles L. Barry, ed., Reforging the Trans-Atlantic 
Relationship (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996),42. 
177 Luigi Barzini, The Europeans (New York: Simon and Schuester, 1983), 154. 
178 Dominque Molsi, "Europe's Odd Couple," in The Prague Post, 20 May 1988. 
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economic weight of Gennany. Due to the reluctance of the British to embrace European 
integration wholeheartedly, the Franco-German couple has remained "the political motor 
of European integration." However, the post-Cold War relationship between France and 
Germany has endured several periods of difficulties attributed to: Mitterrand's initial 
coolness toward the prospect of a unified Germany in 1989-90; French annoyance over 
Germany's early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991; and Germany's displeasure 
when France, in 1995, resumed nuclear testing in the Pacific.179 Most recently, President 
Chirac's announcement in February 1996 halting conscription within the French anned 
services, as well as, the intention to withdraw French troops stationed in Gennany, once 
again threatened to place the Franco-German relationship in a precarious position. 
In an attempt to soothe strained feelings and clarify the Franco-German defense 
relationship, President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl signed the "Franco-German Common 
Concept for Security and Defense" in December 1996. However, the accord contained 
ambiguities and produced additional fodder for debate within both countries for 
Atlanticist and Europeanist political movements alike by raising more questions than it 
answered. Within the "nuclear paragraph," the accords' most· significant clause, the 
nuclear status quo in Europe is upheld with the acknowledgment that the strategic defense 
of Europe will continue to be guaranteed by the "strategic forces of the Alliance, 
particularly those of the United States .... [while] the independent nuclear forces of the 
Britain and France . . . [will continue the] independent deterrent role of their own, 
179 ''The Franco-German axis creaks," The Economist, 9 May 1998,47. 
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contribute to deterrence and to the overall security of the Allies."180 Within France, the 
pursuit of a role for the French deterrent within the NATO Alliance is seen as a clear 
departure from the Gaullist maxims that have dominated French "grand" strategy since 
1958. On the other hand, the accord has also made Germans anxious because of 
Chancellor Kohl's agreement to "open a dialogue on the role of nuclear deterrence within 
the context of European defence pOlicy"181 - a move that could be construed as a 
weakening of the primacy of NATO within German security policy. 
Several factors highlight the complexities of the Franco-German relationship. 
One of the most notable factors that separate France and Germany has been their distinct 
approaches towards relations within the NATO Alliance. German leaders view NATO as 
a means of reassuring fellow Europeans by confining Germany within a system, led by 
the US, but inside which Germany and the Germans have felt at ease. According to 
Ronald Asmus' 1996 RAND survey, nine in ten members of the German elite still regard 
NATO as essential for German security.182 However, it remains clear, as became evident 
during the recent AFSOUTH debate, that the objectives for France's vision of "United 
Europe" as pursued by President Chirac are not in any way to enter NATO's existing 
military structure but rather to reform it radically. Concerning the recent French 
rapprochement with NATO, Chancellor Kohl stated in February 1998 that "in the long 
180 From the Alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept, paragraph 55 cited in "Concept cornmun franco-allemand 
en matj.ere de securite et de defense," Le Montie, 30 January 1997. 
181 The Economist, "Otanising," 8 February 1997, 53. 
182 Ronald Asmus, What does the German Elite think about National Security Policy? (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 1996),3. 
78 
term, for Europe to enjoy its full scope of action in the security and defence spheres, 
France will, of course, have to reintegrate into NATO's military structures."183 
Differing national attitudes towards participation in the Alliance's integrated 
military structure is another factor that separates the Franco-German couple, because of 
the French belief that this structure is dominated by the US. Since France's withdrawal 
from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966, Paris has been selective about 
participating in military command structures not of its design. This distaste for 
"subordinating" French forces to US-led defense efforts in Europe certainly differs from 
German security policies that dictate military integration to the maximum levels possible. 
Moreover, unlike France, Germany has not pursued a national nuclear option. 
For French leaders in the habit of making nuclear decisions exclusively within a 
France-fITst mindset, any critique originating from BonnlBerlin concerning France's 
nuclear force posture and/or doctrine would certainly be received with a less than cordial 
demeanor. In fact, any perception that French leaders were receiving or taking policy 
direction regarding the French nuclear deterrent from Washington, London or 
BonnlBerlin would surely produce problems domestically for the leadership in Paris.184 
Indeed, President Chirac was criticized for his statement in February 1996 implying that 
one of his reasons for eliminating the Hades missiles was to respond to concerns 
expressed by Chancellor Kohl. 
183 Federal Chancellor Kohl, "Security in Tomorrow's World," Speech at the 34th Munich Conference on 
Security Policy, February 7, 1998. Available [Online]: [http://www.germany-nfo.orglgovern/st0298.htm]. 
July 1998. 
184 David S. Yost, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Prospects and Priorities, 29. 
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Finally, there is a growing concern in France and Germany that further discussions 
and/or implementation of the "Eurodeterrent" proposal might jeopardize support for 
nuclear deterrence in both countries)85 Even after the Cold War, German leaders still 
regard NATO's nuclear posture, the extended deterrence protection provided by the US, 
and the regime of Alliance nuclear cooperation as crucial for European security. To a 
lesser extent the same seems to hold true in France. In fact, France's attempts to bring 
about a rapprochement with NATO seemed to be a rather frank and grudgingly given 
admission that, in order for Europe to be more European tomorrow, France must accept 
NATO's significant role in Europe today. Members of Germany's political and academic 
elite have expressed similar judgements. In their view, that further discussions on the 
future of nuclear weapons would be detrimental to the already tenuous acceptance of 
nuclear deterrence in the new Europe.186 Thus, any new debate on such a disputed topic 
may lead to further erosion of the already fragile nuclear consensus in France and 
Germany. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Germany and the Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe," Security Dialogue 26, 
no. 3 (September 1995): 286. 
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D. ANGLO-GERMAN PARTNERSHIP 
As NATO allies and European Union members, Britain and Germany are often 
said to enjoy "a silent alliance."187 Since the 1960s, the "silent alliance" has worked 
closely together to develop a "common" European position (albeit minus France) on 
nuclear forces and arms control in NATO Europe. Consequently, a working relationship 
has developed between Britain and Germany that most of the time remained reserved, 
while at other times has suffered from being taken too much for granted. 188 
In fact, ''the presence of both countries in Europe's two foremost political 
associations should make statements of shared commitments to democracy, the rule of 
law, peace, prosperity and free trade redundant; however, no concrete and exclusive 
arrangement defines their bilateral relationship."189 As peer competitors seemingly 
headed in the opposite direction, Britain has had to deal with a unifie~ Germany that has 
gradually taken over the role as America's leading political and economic partner in 
Europe.190 In fact, the influence of Britain's "special" relationship with the US has 
waned, and as illustrated by the American offers to Germany of the role as "partners in 
187 Edward Foster and Peter Schmidt, Anglo-German Relations in Security & Defence: Taking Stock 
(London: Royal United Service Institute for Defence Studies, 1997), 1. 
188 Karl Kaiser and John Roper, ''What Future for the PartnerShip?," in Karl Kaiser and John Roper, eds., 
British-German Defence Cooperation: Panners within the Alliance (London: Royal Institute for 
International Affairs, 1988),286-287. 
189 Foster and Schmidt, 1. 
190 Michael Franklin and Marc Wilke, Britain in the European Community (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, 1991),9. 
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leadership"in new Europe.191 As the quest for a new European order continues to march 
forward to the drumbeat of the European Union, several reasons are presented to explain 
Germany's indifference on the subject of a Franco-British nuclear umbrella in the 
European context. 
First of all, Germany has indicated little interest in an independent West European 
nuclear deterrent, based on a strategic triangle of London-Paris-BonnlBerlin. "For 
Germany, half-way measures - a loose association with British or French nuclear 
systems ... would not do ... because the British and French forces are small and designed 
for last-ditch retaliation."I92 Although Britain has "expressed no formal nuclear 
assurance to the Federal Republic of Gennany ... beyond that already implicit in the terms 
of the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty," Michael Quinlan has noted, "full 
British commitment to NATO gave the [British nuclear] capability a particular Alliance 
dimension."193 In any case, Germany cannot be expected to take kindly to any attempt 
by France and Britain to award themselves leadership roles within the EU solely on the 
strength of their nuclear capabilities. 
Another reason for German apathy vis-a-vis a "Eurodeterrent" can be attributed to 
the overall confidence with which Germany holds the security guarantees provided by 
America's nuclear deterrent compared to those which might be offered by the British 
191 President George Bush quoted in David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in 
International Security (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, Forthcoming), 53. 
192 GregoryF. Treverton, ''Europe's Past, Europe's Future: Finding an Analogy for Tomorrow," Orbis 37, 
no. 1 (Winter 1993): 11. 
193 Michael Quinlan, Thinking about Nuclear Weapons, Whitehall Papers no. 41 (London: Royal United 
Services for Defence Studies, 1997), 77. 
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and/or the French.194 From the German point of view, US nuclear guarantees have 
always been regarded as the nuclear umbrella that protected NATO Europe from invasion 
by the USSR during the Cold War. Some Germans have declared that the US nuclear 
commitment constitutes a more effective deterrent than a collective and much less 
powerful European deterrent because "by definition, lesser powers cannot guarantee the 
security of a greater power."195 Beyond that, US nuclear guarantees are seen as the 
cornerstone of the US commitment to Europe, a key link with the only remaining 
superpower after the Cold War. 
Edward Foster and Peter Schmidt have noted another factor that highlights the 
division between Britain and Germany - the national approaches to the further 
development of the EUIWEU and a Common Foreign and Security Policy. In this regard, 
Germany has supported a more "systematic" approach towards the development of 
EUIWEU policies by balancing the problems of creating a CFSP with the notion that the 
EU states have already agreed to build "an ever closer union." In fact, the Germans seem 
"to draw strength from the philosophical conviction that they are acting as serious and 
courageous builders"196 of a new European order. On the other hand, the British 
approach has been more "matter-of-fact" with each discussion concerning European 
integration riddled with inconvenient questions, which serve to illuminate the overall 
194 Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Germany and the Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe," 286. 
195 DaVid S. Yost, Western Europe and Nuclear Weapons (Livermore, California: Center for Security and 
Technology Studies, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, University of California, 1993), 18. 
196 Foster and Schmidt, 17. 
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difficulty of creating a common European defense policy. Overall, Britain's incessant 
attention to the EU's lack of benefits and military capabilities invariably seems to point 
back towards Britain's historically reluctant attitudes towards a permanent engagement on 
the European continent. 
Finally, in light of the historical events in the fust half of this century, the thought 
of a resurgent and unified Germany with strategic capabilities provided by nuclear 
weapons makes the British (as well as the French and other Europeans) very uneasy. The 
principal motive behind the 1995 dissuasion concertie initiative was to ensure that 
Europeans (led by France) maintained an alternate response in the event that the US 
should reduce its nuclear commitments to NATO Europe, while to some extent also 
denying nuclear capabilities to Germany. 197 
E. FINAL REMARKS 
Ultimately, the ongoing process of creating an autonomous CFSP for the EU must 
answer the question of how to integrate British and French nuclear forces into a future 
European security architecture that includes thirteen or more non-nuclear weapons states. 
If such a nuclear arrangement were ever to exist, a supranational Brussels leadership 
backed by the London-Paris-BonnlBerlin strategic triangle might be required to assume 
the full scope of Washington's responsibility for nuclear deterrence in Europe. However, 
for the "Eurodeterrent" to become something other that a conceptual model adapted from 
197 David S. Yost, ''Nuclear Weapons Issues in France," in John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds., 
Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China (New 
Brunswick, ME: Transaction Publishers, 1995),40. 
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past attempts at cooperation and collaboration regarding the nuclear lever, several 
essential elements would be needed that currently still do not exist - including a truly 
common executive and a supranational political union. 
Although Britain and France have debated the issues at the highest political levels, 
no "common" nuclear doctrine has been adopted. Instead these bilateral talks have 
apparently managed to brush only the surface of the problems associated with West 
European nuclear cooperation because of an inability to get beyond mere exchanges of 
national views and positions. Therefore, at least in the foreseeable future, it remains 
unlikely that concerns relating to national sovereignty will be successfully overcome to 
allow more effective nuclear deterrent cooperation among the major Western European 
powers. In Josef Joffe's analysis, the development of a nuclear dimension of European 
construction isa problem that: 
... cannot be solved by postulating that a dramatically increased demand 
for self-sufficiency in matters nuclear would finally push West Europeans 
toward political community. If anything, the opposite is true. Precisely 
because nuclear weapons have become the ultima ratio, they touch the 
very core of national sovereignty. When the existential crunch comes, no 
country is likely to risk its physical survival on behalf of another. 
Therefore no country, if given a choice, will entrust its physical survival to 
another, let alone to European Community-type bureaucracy.198 




Western and Central Europe is a potentially awesome centre of power: a 
continental superstate would rival the United States in terms of wealth and 
population ... [the] EU state would possess all the economic, diplomatic, 
and military prerequisites for the creation of a political superpower. 199 
C. Dale Walton 
Indeed, an independent European government backed by a fully autonomous 
Common Foreign and Security Policy would be free to pursue its own international 
agenda with greater latitude and less deference to the inclinations of the United States. 
Leaders in Washington would have less political weight or strategic leverage with which 
to negotiate with the leaders of a ''true'' European Union. However, the biggest hurdle 
that impedes the creation of a "United States of Europe" still remains: From what context 
do the European Union's policies originate? How is EU policy made? Who makes 
policy for the EU? For now, political leaders in London, Paris, and Bonn/Berlin have 
more influence on the direction of the EU than any leader of a "supranational" EU 
organization such as the European Commission in Brussels. 
In fact, the contrasts among Britain, France, and Germany in terms of identities, 
interests, and commitments are far from trivial enough to allow successful integration, for 
now, within a Common Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union and the 
Western European Union. As Peregrine Worsthorne noted, "Nations, like individuals, are 
creatures of habit. . .. They like to do what comes naturally; respond to ancestral 
199 C. Dale Walton, ''Europa United: The Rise of a Second Superpower and its effect on World Order," 
European Security 6, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 46. 
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voices."200 Among Europe's "Big Three", little consensus to date can be found on the 
"course and speed" of integration efforts in European security and defense affairs. 
Western Europe still remains, in Stanley Hoffmann's words, "a collection of largely self-
encased nation states ... If the hostilities entailed by separate pasts appear to have 
evaporated, [Western Europe's] separate pasts have not."201 These "separate pasts" 
mean that the major states of Western Europe interpret events in the light of distinctly 
different lenses - contrasting definitions of interests and priorities. 
Meanwhile, the European reliance on US conventional warfighting assets 
(including C4I and strategic lift) and, more importantly, the US nuclear umbrella, has 
fostered attitudes favorable to maintaining US engagement in Western European security 
affairs within the NATO context. Consequently, in the near term, ESDI will remain a 
means of strengthening the European Pillar within the Atlantic Alliance, not a program 
for dividing the European Allies from the Unites States. Similarly, the WEU allies, for 
now, will rely on NATO for collective defense and remain concerned with the 
"Petersberg tasks," while awaiting a potential political push towards a merger with the 
EU, as its defense arm. 
In the final analysis, due to the complexity of the issues involved in creating a 
multinational European nuclear doctrine and deterrent, the issue of creating a nuclear 
dimension of European construction should be considered the "anchorman" vice the 
200 Peregrine Worsthone, ''What kind of people?," The National Interest, no. 22 (Winter 199011991): 99. 
201 Stanley Hoffman cited in Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign Policy, no. 54 (Spring 
1984): 77. 
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"pacesetter" in the development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Indeed, Britain and France have buttressed national sovereignty by "independent" 
deterrents that serve their respective national interests, while also contributing to NATO 
Europe's overall deterrence posture. Britain and France are in no rush to give up their 
intrinsic rights of national sovereignty with respect to managing their national deterrents. 
Similarly, Germany is in no hurry to. give up its American nuclear guarantees for the 
unknown qualities of guarantees provided by a collaborative Anglo-French nuclear effort. 
This seems just as well because the problem of "devising strategically credible 
and politically satisfactory multilateral nuclear control mechanisms among sovereign 
governments"202 with distinct national agendas also ensures that the probability of 
effective nuclear deterrent cooperation between Britain, France and Germany remains low 
in the foreseeable future. However, the main problem of establishing a nuclear dimension 
of European construction is not doctrinal or technical; the "Eurodeterrent" question 
remains one highlighted by a difference in strategic cultures among Europe's "Big 
Three." As Noel Malcolm has concluded: 
The basic facts of linguistic, cultural, and geographic difference make it 
impossible to imagine federation-wide mass politics ever becoming the 
dominant form of political life in Europe. Instead, the pursuit of national 
interests by national politicians will continue at the highest "European" 
levels. . .. The art of "European" politics, on the other hand, will be to do 
nothing more than dress up national interests as if they were Europe-wide 
ones.203 
202 David S. Yost, Alternative Structures of European Security, Working Paper no. 81 (Washington, DC: 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1987),44. 
203 Noel Malcolm, ''The Case Against 'Europe'," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 65. 
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